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INTRODUCTION

In January 1942, with the United States reeling from the Japanese attack at Pearl
Harbor, the German Navy struck at the heart of American vessels. While the Japanese
forces challenged the might of the American military in the Pacific, the Germans focused
on economically strangling the Allies by sinking their merchant ships in the Atlantic. The
struggle to command the Atlantic pushed the Axis and Allied powers into an everevolving game of cat and mouse, where German submersibles stalked and later fled from
the American forces. This took both the Allies and Axis forces all across the Atlantic
Ocean. The constant skirmishes between these two powers developed into the Battle of
the Atlantic, as both sides looked to gain supremacy. The Atlantic Ocean represented an
important stepping-stone for the Allies to end the war. The Allies needed full control of
the Atlantic to organize the invasion of Europe, while the Germans saw the Atlantic as a
barrier protecting Germany’s Western flank. The need for both the Allies and Axis
powers to control the Atlantic caused the conflict to rage from the beginning of World
War II in 1939 until the German surrender in 1945.
The complexities of the Battle of the Atlantic forced the Allies to improve the
tactics, technologies and training of their forces. The Battle of the Atlantic consisted of
the truly devastating German submarines, known as U-Boats, and a rapidly improving
Allied air force. Both these units discovered new methods of fighting and implemented
more advanced technology to give them an edge in the Atlantic. Both the Axis and Allies
developed more convoluted and intricate equipment. As a result, the operators needed
more education to properly use them. Thus, a lack of trained personnel at times rendered
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technological advances useless. Mastering the technologies and tactics of Atlantic patrols
allowed for American pilots to help the Allies win the Battle of the Atlantic.
In this Independent Study, I focus on the training of aircrews as the reason why
the Allies ultimately won the Battle of the Atlantic. Most authors who write about the
Battle of the Atlantic attribute victory to multiple factors, including training. However
these historians only give the reader a glimpse of the complicated training situation. This
thesis examines the different phases of training in regards to anti-submarine warfare, thus
giving the reader a comprehensive look at another factor in the Allied conquest.
As I previously stated, none of the prominent historians writing on the Battle of
the Atlantic detailed the changes of training for anti-submarine aircrews. These different
books discuss multiple topics, and therefore aspects like training lack the necessary
explanation that would allow for a comprehensive understanding into the importance of
the human element. My Independent Study reinforces the current belief that training
helped win the Battle of the Atlantic, but I have also gone further to explain why and
how. I describe specific curriculums and how the level of training coincided with
different stages of the Battle of the Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic held a key part of
the Second World War where both sides worked to control the ocean. Therefore,
improving the Allied aircrews held a key component in winning the Battle of the
Atlantic.
The historians who write about the Battle of the Atlantic only award partial credit
to Allied training for the Allied victory in the Atlantic. These authors explain the
importance of the men involved in the conflict as a reason for the Allies’ victory in the
Battle of the Atlantic. For example, S.W. Roskill, the author of the multi-volume War at
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Sea, explains how endurance, skill and moral purpose of the men became pivotal in the
outcome of the battle. He stated that since the Battle of the Atlantic contained “no limits
in time or space,” and the battlefield had no specific boundaries, the drive of the men won
the battle. Thus, Roskill touches on the importance of training in the final victory. He
states how technology simply aided the men as they fought the U-Boats.1
Another author, David Syrett, strongly attributes German failures in explaining
the Allied superiority in the Atlantic. He first states that the German high command never
discovered an effective way in countering the Allied convoy system. The inability for
German U-Boats to make a successful attack on a convoy prevented the U-Boats from
achieving their number one objective, to cripple the Allied economies. Syrett explains
that in both World War I and II the Germans needed to develop a better strategy for
sinking the Allied merchant vessels due to the effectiveness of the Allied convoy system.2
Secondly, Syrett explains that the Germans inadequacies in intelligence work hurt
their chances of success. The U-Boats had incomplete knowledge of convoy routes in the
Atlantic because most commanders only had information from deciphered radio
messages from the Allies. Once the Allies changed their code, the Germans had to rely on
their air command, the Luftwaffe, for sea locations. Unfortunately for the Germans, the
coordination between the air and land branches lacked any cooperation.
David Syrett goes on to describe technological faults for the German defeat. The
U-Boat, although improved from the model in the First World War, still contained
obvious flaws. The Germans never fixed the problem of making their submersibles more

1
2

S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea: II, 355.
David Syrett, The Defeat of the German U-Boat: The Battle of the Atlantic, 259.
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submarine like.3 A submersible, like a submarine, has the ability to submerge itself
beneath the water. However, a submarine, in contrast to a submersible, can operate
effectively underwater. Once a U-Boat sunk below the water, many of their abilities
became inefficient. For example, the speed of a U-Boat underwater decreased to such a
level that even the slowest merchant ship outran it.
Syrett finally explains that the German military never took advantage of scientific
researchers to improve their forces. This made ASWORG, an American organization
devoted to scientific analysis to improve weapons and strategies, that much more
important since Germany failed to implement a similar force. Syrett touched on the
importance of improvement through scientific thought. The Germans lacked essential
advice on how to fix current techniques or tactics. Without an organized group devoted to
researching and analyzing U-Boat strategies, the Germans had no chance to use their
machines to its full potential.
The last prominent author on the Battle of the Atlantic, Samuel Morison in his
book, The Battle of the Atlantic, weighed in on how the Allies achieved victory in the
Battle of the Atlantic. He explained that no ‘one’ answer could describe how the Allies
won. Instead, he writes that we must look to several different reasons that together,
pushed the German U-Boats back. These reasons included better technology, tactics,
resources and training. He then builds a connection between all of the aspects above,
explaining, “Coastal convoys were impossible without more escorts and patrol planes;
ships were ineffective without proper detection devices and offensive weapons; these in

3
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turn needed operators trained in special schools…”4 This explanation shows a certain
correlation between training and other factors as a reason why the Allies won the Battle
of the Atlantic. Therefore the Allies’ focus on training helped them not only control the
Atlantic Ocean, but also attain total victory in World War II
Both the Axis and Allies focused on the Atlantic Ocean because the Battle of the
Atlantic influenced future operations in the Second World War. For the Allies, safety in
the Atlantic permitted European operations. The Allies needed to transport equipment
and soldiers to open a new front in Europe.5 The Axis powers saw the Atlantic as a way
to tie down Allied resources and to prevent a European invasion.6 The Battle of the
Atlantic represented a first line of defense in the war. Whoever controlled the Atlantic
had the ability to coordinate more devastating attacks on the other. Thus, the victor in
World War II needed to win the Battle of the Atlantic. To do this, every country worked
to advance their armed forces. Besides improvements in personnel, technology helped to
give the Allies an advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic.
In the Great War, from 1914 until 1919, technology entered a new domain; its
successes motivated every military force to further develop its weapons. In World War II,
the experimental technologies of the early 20th century took incredible leaps forward.
Technology in the field of battle caused a drastic change in strategy. Weapons like the
tank, airplane and submarine entered World War I as an improved way to achieve
victory. The first tank, known as a “land ship” first fought in the Battle of FlersCourcelette in 1916, as a way to cross enemy trenches. Although the tank struggled to
4

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of
the Atlantic: September 1939- May 1943. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), 203-204.
5
Richard Hough, 306.
6
Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic:
September 1939- May 1943, 402.
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operate effectively, they overpowered German defenses.7 Airplanes held observational
and attacking roles in the First World War. Each country created its own air unit years
before 1914 and as a result their uses aided each side during the entirety of the war. 8 The
U-Boat, like airplanes, existed years before the First World War and similar to the tank,
needed further development to operate at a level of superiority.9 All three of these
weapons changed the doctrines of battle and military strategies. A new form of warfare
emerged and like the technology, the crews of each weapon needed to master the
instruments to fight at an optimum level. In a sphere where machinery expected to enter
with the certainty of ascendancy, the military needed their personnel to improve too. This
meant that those operating advanced equipment had to learn their respective machines. In
the Battle of the Atlantic, pilots proceeded to master their airplanes and the technology
inside. Only when man and machine both worked harmoniously, did they evolve into an
effective entity.
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, America entered a war unprepared to
defend its shores. America did not have enough pilots to effectively patrol their Eastern
coastline. The trained aircrews in both the Navy and Army Air Force operated in the
Pacific theater due to the immediate problems from the Japanese.10 The crews that
patrolled the Atlantic Ocean had little training, if any, in anti-submarine operations.
These men made many mistakes that cost the Allies tons of supplies needed in the war
effort.

7

William Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century 332-333.
Lee Kennett, The First Air War 1914-1918 218-221.
9
William Archer, The Pirate’s Progress: A Short History of the U-Boat xi-1.
10
The Aviation History Unit, The Navy’s Air War: A Mission Completed (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers), 29.
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American pilots made numerous mistakes in the first few months of the war.
Pilots sent to protect the coast conducted missions in a completely unfamiliar setting
from where they trained. Army Air Force pilots, untrained in anti-submarine patrols,
picked up the slack for the Navy in anti-submarine operations.11 It took time for Army
Air Force pilots to learn how to conduct searches and attacks on this new enemy from
scratch.
Non-military personnel also joined the U-Boat war. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP)
consisted mostly of men unfit for service, since most able-bodied men joined the military.
This included those above and below the age limit, and those with a physical ailment that
prohibited them from joining the military.12 With the equipment the Civil Air Patrol had,
they helped the war effort tremendously. However, when it came to attacking U-Boats,
CAP pilots did not have the needed training to understand how to improve on their
abilities.
The training programs in the military also failed in preparing incoming pilots for
the complexities of anti-submarine operations. Early American training facilities, during
World War II, had not prepared for the immense increase in students and therefore they
lacked the resources to train.13 These programs worked to reorganize themselves in order
to create a clear and concise path for their pilots in training to follow.
After months of overall failures in anti-submarine warfare, the Army and Navy
called on the brilliant and relatively untapped minds of American scientists. The military
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Office of Air Force History, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations:
January 1939 To August 1942. (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 521.
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Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic:
September 1939- May 1943, 276.
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hired civilian scientists to analyze the shameful situation in the Atlantic and to give the
military advice.14 Researchers concluded that Allied pilots did not properly use the
technologies, techniques and tactics essential for protecting Allied cargo ships. Only after
operations researchers studied the low amounts of U-Boats sunk did the American
military realize what to teach all of their pilots.
When it came to technology, aircrews did not use their depth charges effectively
until the analysts made recommendations. A weapon first created for use on ships, the
depth charge had a deeper detonation setting. On a ship, this later setting allowed for the
Allied vessel to travel out of range before the charge exploded. When the depth charges
moved to airplanes, this previous setting failed to damage a majority of their targets
because aircrews dropped their charges on top of a patrolling U-Boat. The deeper setting
that the Allies used for protecting their ships, instead allowed for the U-Boat to escape
from harm.15 Operations researchers discovered that a shallow charge exploded at a lethal
distance more often.
The Army and Naval air forces, like anti-submarine technologies, also neglected
proper technique in the first few months of 1942. The ways in which an airplane flew and
attacked a U-Boat, allowed for their target to get away. Too often Allied aircrews
initiated their attack run when they realized that the U-Boat had already started to safely
submerge making it unlikely for these aircrews to make an effective strike.16 The next
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Philip M. Morse, “The Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States,” Operations Research
34, no. 1 (January 1986): 11.
15
Charles Sternhell and Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, (Washington, D.C.,
1946) 137.
16
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aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic that scientists studied enabled pilots to make a surprise
attack on a German submarine. This included camouflage and baiting techniques.
The method of searching for a U-Boat also joined with technologies and
techniques as an aspect of anti-submarine warfare in need of improvement. What use
would an effective attack run and proper weapons settings have if aircrews could not
locate the U-Boats on route to the American coastline? Operations researchers analyzed
the best pattern to search for U-Boats and the length of each mission. Specifically, these
scientists found out the impact that altitude had on spotting an enemy submarine.17
In the end, operations researchers transformed anti-submarine warfare during
World War II and they also demonstrated how training positively influenced Allied
effectiveness in the Battle of the Atlantic. The discoveries made by civilian analysts not
only modified what training programs taught, but they also introduced new material for
these facilities. Anti-submarine warfare was a relatively new concept for America,
especially on the scale at which they had to fight. Operations analysts studied an
unfamiliar battle and their discoveries added much needed information for every Allied
pilot, both in training and in the field.18
The analysis made by civilian scientists combined with the improvements of
training commands developed an air arm ready for anti-submarine operations. Aircrews,
with improved training, attacked more U-Boats, sank more U-Boats and the lethal

17

Professor C.H. Waddington, 162.
The Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command published a monthly summary report on anti-submarine
operations. Some of the chapters detailed the problems with aircrew attacks or new techniques to try. I
placed a more descriptive synopsis of these reports in the annotated bibliography.
18
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percentage of each attack increased greatly.19 After August 1943, Allied forces controlled
the Atlantic Ocean and merchant vessels traveled to their destinations safely.
For the United States, once the Battle of the Atlantic began, they struggled to
defend their territory. A lack of training contributed to the inadequate protection made by
American pilots. Aircrews had little knowledge in anti-submarine operations or how to
use the technologies onboard. Only after the United States focused on building up antisubmarine personnel, did they subdue the German U-Boats.
In an ever-evolving battle that cost the Allies millions of dollars, the Battle of the
Atlantic showed its relevance in winning the Second World War. After the Allied victory
against the U-Boat, the United States targeted the European mainland. Although
advances in technology and proper implementation of airplanes helped to defeat the
German submarines, without trained aircrews patrolling the Atlantic the Battle would
have raged on for much longer. The Allies needed to learn how to use the technology
available in order to increase the strength of the American defenses.

19

Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, August 1943: Monthly Intelligence Report,
August 1943, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/, 23.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC:
A LOOK AT THE CONFLICT1

Both the Axis and Allied powers saw the significance in controlling the seas, and
more specifically, the Atlantic Ocean. Since the Atlantic separated the United States and
Great Britain, the ability to trade effectively depended on who dominated the waters.
Also, considering the fact that the English Channel divided Great Britain and Nazi
occupied France, naval dominance affected the competence of an invading force. The
importance of the Atlantic compelled both countries to send their forces in an attempt to
gain full control. The subsequent conflict evolved into the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Battle of the Atlantic matched the newly reinforced Allies against a uniquely
altered German Navy. Germany, a landlocked country had little hope in building a
surface Navy powerful enough to fight Great Britain. In response to this weakness, they
capitalized on their experimental use in submarines from World War I. Germany
commissioned hundreds of these U-Boats to take part in patrolling the Atlantic for Allied
ships, later named the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany improved on the technologies and
strategies of the German submarines implemented during the Great War, thus making
them a lethal force.
The German U-Boats served as Nazi Germany’s best weapon in the Atlantic,
despite their difference with traditional surface vessels. The damage a U-Boat dealt came
1

For this chapter I used mainly secondary sources to provide information into who, what, where, when,
why and how of the Battle of the Atlantic. This chapter provides essential background information in the
battle, thus allowing me to argue my point effectively. One primary source that I utilized in this chapter
was Samuel Morison’s Battle of the Atlantic. He saw the immense effort involved in the Battle of the
Atlantic and wrote about the Battle’s complexities.
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from their torpedoes. This self-guided weapon moved towards other objects and exploded
on contact. Early in the war, compressed air propelled the torpedoes. This method created
a trail behind the torpedo that allowed for the evasive maneuvers of Allied ships.2 Since
Germany improved their escaping and attacking capabilities in the first months of the
war, the U-Boats harassed and sank hundreds of Allied ships. Also, because U-Boats took
the initiative in Atlantic operations in 1940 and later in 1942, the field of battle changed
in favor of the German submarines. The change in scenery and tactics bought the
Germans more time as a superior force in the Atlantic. But, in time, the German U-Boats
suffered from technological stagnation. Admiral Doenitz, the German commander of the
U-Boat arm, categorized the German U-Boat as a diving vessel instead of the popular
impression that this ship functioned forcefully under water.3
German U-Boats acted less like submarines and more like submersibles, making
them a useless weapon underwater. A submarine describes a ship that can navigate
underwater, while a submersible only has the ability to submerge itself. Although a UBoat can in fact navigate underwater, its incapability to maneuver and its lack of speed
most likely explained the Admiral Doenitz’s characterization.4 Once a U-Boat operated
below the surface, their effectiveness decreased dramatically. Specifically their
movement and attacking capabilities worsened. Underneath the surface a U-Boat moved
slower than even the slowest merchant vessel. More often then not, a patrolling aircraft
protected countless cargo ships, simply because they flew over a U-Boat as it tried to get
close to a convoy. Due to the poor capabilities of a U-Boat underwater, commanders
needed to operate on the surface in many cases. This created a favorable opportunity for
2

David Mason, U-Boat the Secret Menace, (New York: Ballantine Books Inc. 1968) 15.
Mason, 14.
4
Henceforth I will refer to the submarines as submersibles.
3
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Allied aircrews since they could only find and attack a U-Boat on the surface of the
water. Above the water, U-Boats could manage to sail at a brisk seventeen knots, faster
than an Allied cargo ship. On the other hand, once the U-Boat submerged its speed
slowed to three knots. This rendered them incapable of catching even the slowest Allied
ship.5 The inadequacy of the U-Boat to operate effectively beneath the surface gave the
Allies a key advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Allies first needed to counter the
German U-Boat tactics.
Before America entered the Second World War, German submersibles attacked
lone merchant vessels independently. This battle doctrine gave the Germans early
successes in the war. The Germans enjoyed early victories with this strategy due to the
carelessness of the Allied navies to develop new technology and tactics in the thirty years
between World Wars.6 With little or no protection from other vessels, German
submersibles sank countless merchant ships. U-Boats preyed on merchant vessels that
operated without protective support because merchant ships lacked defensive
technologies, making battles with U-Boats one sided. Only when the Allies implemented
effective countermeasures did the German Navy change their strategy.
The Allies chose to implement escort vessels, which had the capability of sinking
a U-Boat, as a key countermeasure to protect a merchant ship. Unfortunately, this tactic
took time to organize because of the scarce number of resources available for protective
missions. America, like Great Britain, clung to a traditionalist idea pertaining to the
future of their respective navies. The United States’ built their naval forces under the

5

Andrew Roberts, The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War, (New York: Harper
Perennial, 2011) 359.
6
Edward Von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II. (New York: Galahad Books, 1969), 168.
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direction of a “big gun in a big ship.” As a result, the American Navy had scarce amounts
of escort and smaller vessels needed in anti-submarine operations.7
It took some time before Great Britain realized the best strategy against the
German submersibles. Early in the war the British military ordered their Navy to go on
the offensive and to search for any U-Boat across the Atlantic. This meant that less
resources and ships were available to protect the merchant vessels.8 Great Britain needed
to find the best way to stop Germany’s success against their merchant ships.
To prevent the U-Boat from sinking any more merchant vessels, British
commanders implemented a convoy system to protect cargo ships. Convoys existed long
before the Second World War, and the Allies used this tactic quite often during the First
World War to combat the U-Boats.9 A convoy joined several different cargo ships going
to the same destination with escort ships. These escorts surrounded the merchant vessels
and deterred any U-Boat from attacking them. In response, the Germans began to attack
convoys with several U-Boats simultaneously.
These groups of U-Boats, known as “Wolf Packs,” spread out and fired at
convoys making their protection techniques ineffective. In these “Wolf Packs” one single
U-Boat spotted a convoy and would alert all nearby submersibles to converge at their
position. The Allies needed to either track U-Boats before they got in lethal range or have
one of the ships in the convoy keep the submersibles occupied by patrolling the waters
where they spotted a U-Boat. The improvement of radar and other detection technologies
served to help any ship avoid a U-Boat. Airplanes helped the Allied convoys by keeping
the submersibles busy before they reached their destination.
7

Gilbert Cant, America’s Navy in World War II. (New York: The John Day Company, 1943) 285.
Roberts, 356.
9
Marc Milner, Battle of the Atlantic (Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2003), 9.
8
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Aircraft helped patrol the Atlantic Ocean to aid in a battle whose frontlines
extended for thousands of miles. Since the submersible could hide below the surface, it
turned into a hard target to find, let alone sink even for convoys. Aircraft solved the
problems of having to search for a patrolling U-Boat. Airplanes achieved a greater
distance and speed than surface vessels. Once an airplane caught a U-Boat they could call
for ships and even other airplanes to join in the fight. Both sides understood the
importance of air power and used planes for reconnaissance and for attacking. This made
the Battle of the Atlantic more than just a naval engagement.
The break away from the cliché naval battles, where battleships fought at close
range as seen a century before, forced the Allies to change from their traditional
strategies to more contemporary ones, which involved the implementation of aircraft as a
crucial actor in the battle. These new methods of naval engagements pushed the Allies to
both improve on existing weapons and to develop new ways to fight an elusive enemy. In
response, Germany expanded and strengthened their U-Boats to counter new Allied
advancements. The constant evolution of new technologies and policies by both sides
created a seesaw of advancement that forced both the Allied and Axis powers to plot their
next tactical move.
Merchant shipping emerged as the focus of this battle, and therefore the reason
why both sides searched for any advantage. The Allies attempted to protect their cargo
ships in order to continue the war effort. The Germans used their resources to sink the
cargo ships in a struggle to starve the Allies. As their objective, Germany attacked
merchant vessels moving toward England, in an attempt to destroy Allied trade routes. In
the first few years of the war, Germany succeeded in their goal of strangling Great Britain

15

economically. Without a secure ocean, the American and British forces could not hope to
deal a decisive blow against Nazi Germany. For the Germans, this battle protected their
acquired lands in Western Europe. The Allies would not dare to invade Nazi occupied
Europe when submersibles still patrolled the Atlantic Ocean effectively. In the first few
years of World War II, Great Britain worried about her future.
Less than a year after the Second World War began, the Allies performed at a
disadvantage. With Germany’s conquest of France and the Low Countries in 1940, the
German Navy had three thousand miles of coastline to operate in, instead of the three
hundred miles restricted to Germany before the war began.10 Thus, German forces evaded
the English Channel. The channel became an effective bottleneck against the U-Boat
because the British ships could better find and attack the U-Boats in the concentrated
waters that separated Germany and the Atlantic Ocean. These submersibles functioned
effectively in the Atlantic Ocean against the British military and economy because they
operated throughout the Atlantic. Conducting naval operations against this new kind of
weapon did not overly concern British commanders and therefore the amount of change
necessary did not occur.11
With this disability of fighting the Germans across thousands of miles, Great
Britain relied on her ally across the Atlantic. The United States Government agreed to
help the British Empire against the Axis powers while still staying neutral. Prime
Minister Winston Churchill appealed to the Americans for support, explaining how the
German U-Boats have strangled Great Britain’s economy.12 The United States helped

10

Richard Hough, The Longest Battle. (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc, 1986,) 37
Hough, 12.
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Hough, 43.
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their ally by trading fifty old destroyers for British bases overseas.13 These ships helped
the British forces in their convoy formations that protected their merchant ships. The
United States benefitted from this trade since the destroyers exchanged had little use for
America. The United States, at the time, had not declared war on the Axis powers. Their
resources had not been stretched like it’s soon to be ally, Great Britain.
The Battle of the Atlantic took both the Allies and Axis powers to places far from
their bases. The German U-Boats operated off the coasts of England, France, United
States, Caribbean, Newfoundland and Western Africa. At the beginning of the war, the
German submersibles took advantage of the unprepared Allies, stretching their resources.
Their U-Boats sailed from one coast to another with little worry of being sunk. Once
Allied forces realized the potential of aircraft along with its sharpened abilities, U-Boats
had to patrol waters unavailable to aircrews. Finding a gap that prevented Allied forces
from unleashing their airplanes allowed the U-Boats to remain effective even though the
Allies surpassed their elusive tactics. The Mid-Atlantic gap, an area in the Northern
Atlantic out of range of Allied airplanes, became the final sphere of this extensive battle.
It took the Allies roughly six months to close this pocket, ending a conflict that lasted
almost as long as the war itself.
Airplanes enabled the Allies to add different and more effective weaponry to the
battle. Unlike battleships, airplanes could search further distances and safely operate
above the water. Even if an airplane failed to sink a submersible, their presence scared
the U-Boat enough that it submerged. The advantages of aircraft included their ability to
search, find, and attack any ship on the surface of the water. Once a submersible sank
below the water, aircrews had little power to damage them. Also important, the U-Boat
13
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had little power against the Allies when they operated underwater. The inabilities of the
German submersibles to operate productively beneath the surface allowed for more
effective Allied countermeasures.
America spent a large amount of time and money to fight and eventually win the
Battle of the Atlantic. Lieutenant Commander Samuel Morison, a naval historian who
served during World War II, commented that, “The amount of study, energy and expense
necessary to combat a few hundred enemy submersibles is appalling.”14 Fiscally, he
states that in counting the ships and time lost in the Battle of the Atlantic the Allies spent,
“…some hundreds of billions of dollars…”15
In a battle that took many years and that occurred all over the Atlantic, each side
incorporated different resources in an attempt to gain an upper hand. Technological
advances, intelligence information and even the proper application of aircraft drastically
helped both sides in the battle. A less publicized aspect that bolstered the Allied Atlantic
force was aircrew training. What use did technology have if the men operating them
could not use them effectively? Only when aircrews and airplanes operated harmoniously
did they destroy the U-Boat menace. In England, Winston Churchill described Great
Britain’s conflict with the German U-Boat, “Such is the U-Boat war – hard, widespread
and bitter, a war of groping and drowning, a war of ambuscade and stratagem, a war of
science and seamanship.”16 In a campaign that took place on a battlefield the size of the
Atlantic Ocean, the ideas of a simple battle were thrown out.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE SECOND HAPPY TIME:
THE FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE THE U-BOAT1
“After years of blackout conditions in Europe the [American] shoreline looked
like a carnival.”2 Marc Milner, a historian on the Battle of the Atlantic, made this
comment to describe the reaction of the first U-Boat commanders operating in American
waters. The stunning realization, that America lacked the preparation for anti-submarine
warfare, made by the U-Boat commanders represented America’s failure to anticipate the
German onslaught. The inability to fully develop anti-submarine defenses afflicted
America’s shipping once the first U-Boats attacked. The United States soon recognized
that their current strategies were ineffective against the submersible menace. The amount
of cargo sunk in the first couple months of the war and the gross failure of attacks on UBoats compelled the German forces to call this offensive the “second happy time.” The
first, being off the English coast in 1940 when the U-Boats decimated English shipping.
The German submersible force under Admiral Karl Doenitz enjoyed relative ease
in slaughtering Allied merchant vessels because the aircrews protecting these merchant
ships lacked proper training. The Allies needed to improve aircraft technologies, and
increase the amount resources for anti-submarine warfare, but they also needed to train
their pilots in newer techniques that readied them for anti-submarine operations. Many of
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the aviators assigned to patrol the Atlantic Ocean for U-Boats never practiced in the
techniques of anti-submarine warfare. Also, most of the tactics of anti-submarine
operations had yet to be discovered. After actual patrols, the United States military
noticed the failures of aircrews. These inadequacies allowed for the German submersibles
to stalk and sink Allied merchant vessels.
Since the German submersibles surprised the American defensive forces, U-Boats
sank a massive amount of merchant cargo. From January until April 1942, America’s
Eastern Coast, known as the Eastern Sea Frontier, took the most damage. Between these
months, the Allies lost an average of over 20 ships and over 120,000 gross tons of cargo.3
After April 1942, the Germans began to move towards America’s Southern Coast. In this
area the Germans sunk an average of twenty-six ships a month and over 125,000 gross
tons of cargo.4 A failure of training the pilots in effective anti-submarine tactics led to the
large loss of cargo and, more importantly, the survival of the German submersible force.
When examining the failures of aircrews, I focus on the attacks made on the UBoats and the amount of German submersibles sunk. German U-Boats, for the most part,
submerged at the first sight of an airplane. This prevented aircrews from sinking the
submersible. While underwater, a U-Boat moved at such a sluggish speed that merchant
vessels got away safely.5 When the aircrews missed their target, the submersibles simply
reemerged and stalked the next vessel. Under these circumstances, it did not matter how
much training the pilots received. This game of cat and mouse could have gone on for
years because of the insignificant damage dealt to the U-Boats or the Allied airplanes.
3
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Only after the aircrews started to attack these German forces effectively, did U-Boat
commanders weigh their options on retreating. Regrettably, months passed before
competent attacks pushed the German forces away from the Western Atlantic.
In the first half of 1942, American aviators, ordered to protect the United States’
shoreline, failed to do their duty because they lacked adequate training in anti-submarine
operations. Anti-submarine warfare evolved throughout the Battle of the Atlantic; thus
every pilot needed updates on how to conduct these operations. Specifically in antisubmarine operations, search and attack methods changed constantly. The United States
had to improve their current technologies in order to get an edge in the Battle of the
Atlantic. The complexities of anti-submarine warfare also caused the Allies to discover
new tactics and techniques useful in destroying U-Boats. The progress of anti-submarine
methods that were developed and enhanced, forced every pilot to continuously train in
new approaches to combat. Even trained Naval aviators before Pearl Harbor needed
experience in anti-submarine operations to improve their abilities. At the beginning of the
war, American pilots had little knowledge in the proper ways of patrolling the Atlantic.
Only after both pilots and scientists could observe the battle more closely, did pilots learn
how to effectively attack and sink the Axis submersibles. Even though the current
strategies needed improvement, the Navy had the best training for this kind of warfare.
At first, Navy did its best to protect the coast. Unfortunately the Navy lacked the
proper organization of their training commands, which hindering communication
between divisions and the establishment of a single lesson plan. Besides this problem, the
Navy withdrew from the Atlantic because of Japan’s successes in the Pacific. This left
other pilots, untrained in Naval engagements, as defenders against a well-prepared U-
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Boat force. The first of these pilots were from the Army Air Corps later renamed the
Army Air Force.
The Army Air Force only had jurisdiction in land-based operations, making
Atlantic patrols an unknown area of operations. Also the Army Air Corps needed to
reform its organization to better prepare the cadets. Pilots rushed through training to
increase the number of aircrews available. This drastic move for growth of the Army Air
Corps confused Allied commanders in charge of training. Besides these faults, all Army
Air Force pilots went through preflight and flight training, which taught the pilots how to
effectively fly their airplanes, unlike the Civil Air Patrol.
The Civil Air Patrol, an air unit comprised of American civilians, joined the Army
Air Force as a unit devoted to anti-submarine patrols but these civilian pilots never had
training in anti-submarine operations. The Civil Air Patrol worked to take the pressures
off the military pilots ordered to search the coastline. Although this group greatly boosted
the security off the American coast, the members of the Civil Air Patrol lacked eligibility
for military duty. The United States, in the first few months of 1942, expected these pilots
to only search for U-Boats and communicate with the military so that the Army and Navy
Air Forces could attack them. Over time, the Civil Air Patrol pilots began carrying bombs
and depth charges to engage the German submersibles.6 Due to the lack of training in
anti-submarine warfare, these civilian pilots had little success in destroying the German
U-Boats. A successful unit needed to master the tactics and technologies of antisubmarine warfare.
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For every pilot, the advancement of anti-submarine technologies hurt their ability
to patrol the Atlantic because of the slow speed it took to implement new technologies in
American airplanes. The United States barely started to improve the detection and
attacking technologies on their airplanes, making a majority of pilots rely on their
untested abilities in the Atlantic. Also, once the military added new technologies to the
airplane, pilots still needed to learn the ins and outs of these machines. In some cases the
pilots failed to apply these technologies correctly.
All of these reasons mentioned above interfered with America’s attempts to
thwart the German submersibles. These examples share a common theme: that the United
States did not have much knowledge in modern anti-submarine operations when they
joined their British Allies in the Second World War. Due to that fact, the Allies lost a
significant amount of merchant vessels and cargo.
From the beginning of World War II, the United States fought an up-hill battle to
secure the Atlantic Ocean. After the unexpected attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States
entered into a war that it was not entirely prepared to wage. Japan invaded the Philippines
after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, forcing America to deploy its forces to the
Pacific. The American citizenry later realized that not just Japan, but also Germany
advanced into U.S. territory. In the hopes of disrupting the United States’ trade routes and
decreasing the amount of resources sent to Great Britain, the German Navy ordered their
experienced and menacing U-Boats to attack merchant vessels on America’s Eastern
coast. The German attack, known as Operation Drumbeat, sent several U-Boats to prey
on the defenseless Allied vessels in the Atlantic.7 Pilots resisted the incursion and ordered
7
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patrols to search for any German vessel. The Navy operated with a diminutive air force of
trained personnel, but not even proper schooling qualified them for the task at hand.
Experienced pilots still required more guidance to accurately attack German UBoats. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, pilots worked with newer technologies and
tested different tactics. Even though having an experienced aircrew strengthened
American defenses, much more than the cadets just out of flying school, they still had
much to learn. Anti-submarine warfare calls for special skills of the pilots in order for
them to have a significant impact.
Air forces that conducted anti-submarine operations had different equipment and
tactics than aviators trained in dog fighting, where two planes fought to destroy each
other, or area bombing, where a plane dropped several bombs on a ground target. Samuel
Morison, a prominent World War II Naval historian writes, “Both Navies recognized
early in the war that normal naval training was not enough to qualify sailors to hunt and
kill submarines; special training was required not only in tactics, but in radar, sonar,
depth-charging, air-bombing, and the use of a variety of weapons.”8 When the United
States entered World War II, American aviators could not conduct anti-submarine
operations at a maximum level. They did not have the specific training, a general
doctrine, or experience to properly teach students the efficient techniques to sink a UBoat.
Proper schooling helped pilots in their mission, but experience further improved
these same pilots. Experience gave pilots key information that they did not previously
realize. The more missions a pilot went on allowed the military to accurately see what

8

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 10, The Atlantic
Battle Won: May 1943- May 1945. (Boston: Little Brown And Company, 1956), 8.

24

attack methods worked, and how the U-Boat responded to these strikes. In early
campaigns, like the German thrust against the American coast, aviators did not have any
familiarity with this relatively new kind of warfare. The most efficient procedures, “had
to be learned through actual experience, and, owning to the urgent need for
Antisubmarine patrols, the air units were forced to accomplish their training in the course
of operational missions.”9 Since pilots in their first few missions never practiced in the
kind of warfare expected from them, they made many mistakes. Despite a lack of
experience, trained Naval aircrews had a major advantage over the other pilots because
the Navy provided classes that prepared their cadets for patrol bombing missions.
Naval aviation training prepared cadets for a variety of water-based operations,
including anti-submarine operations known as patrol bombing. Before entering combat,
all naval cadets went through an extensive curriculum that included pre-flight training,
primary training, intermediate training, and operational training.10 All of these divisions
came together and produced pilots with the best skill-set to fight the U-Boats in 1942.
After pre-flight training, where the pilots readied themselves for the physical
demands of the United States Navy, the pilots moved on to Primary Flight Training.11
During this two-month event, the cadets learned how to operate an airplane.12 In
Intermediate Flight Training, the pilots requested in which type of duty they wanted to
specialize, although in some cases the Navy did not listen to the pilots’ request.13 In the
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first step in this training, the pilots reviewed what they learned in Primary Flight Training
but with a heavier aircraft. The heavier aircraft more closely resembled the plane the
cadet would fly in combat. The pilots then mastered in-plane instruments and subsequent
navigation. Later, these pilots separated to study the specifics of their individual duties.
This part of the training program taught pilots the intricacies of patrol bombing, which
the Army Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol did not address.
The Naval cadets whom the Navy designated as patrol bombers (VPB) trained for
ninety hours in six stages: familiarization, instruments, navigation, formation, bombing,
machine gunnery, and night familiarization.14 After the cadets completed intermediate
training they received their wings, making them Naval Aviators. These Naval Aviators
soon moved on to operational training.15 During operational training, the pilots learned
more extensive information pertaining to their chosen field. The VPB pilots assigned to
anti-submarine missions, learned particular bombing techniques. Also at this stage, the
rest of the crew needed to operate with the pilot, such as the navigator, joined with their
pilot to work as a unit.16 Although the curriculum for pilots gave the cadet necessary
information and practice, the organization of the divisions needed better communication
between the commands.
Indirect communication between the Navy department and the individual air
stations, where the training and operations occurred, hurt the Navy’s ability to correspond
with each other. In Pensacola, Florida, the commandant of the Naval district acted as a
field representative between the Navy department and the Naval Air Stations. This kind
of communication became, “merely a routine, time-consuming operation, for the
14
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commandant rarely had on his staff any officer who was familiar with naval aviation.”17
Thus, correspondence between the Navy Department and each station went through
personnel with little knowledge in Naval aviation, before the message reached its
destination. Another demonstration of the Navy’s ineffectiveness occurred in December
1940. A subcommittee of the committee on Naval Affairs in the House of
Representatives visited Naval Aviation training activities and concluded that in its current
state, training facilities functioned in an unsatisfactory condition. The Naval bases
operated in thirteen different districts and a man with no experience in Naval aviation
first interpreted general policies.18
The Navy trained intensively in patrolling waters in the years before Pearl Harbor.
Besides the fact that anti-submarine operations entered as a new form of battle for the
United States Navy, the training, which naval aircrews received in early 1942, occurred
years before Pearl Harbor. Although these aircrews did not practice attacking U-Boats,
they became experts at using their equipment and patrolling for large amounts of time,
needed for anti-submarine operations. Sadly, with the dire situation in the Pacific, the
amount of naval aviators in the Atlantic coast decreased substantially.
The United States Navy had the overwhelming responsibility of protecting both
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Navy later stationed most of their forces in the
Pacific at the beginning of the war.19 With most of the American citizenry and military
focused on the Pacific theater, Germany’s submersibles enjoyed the relative ease in
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sinking cargo ships. The United States Navy did have some squadrons in the Atlantic but
they did not have adequate resources for the immense task in front of them.
In January 1942 the Naval air force had four squadrons of Catalina flying boats,
one squadron of Mariners and one of Hudsons. The Navy divided some of these
squadrons to cover large amounts of water.20 Since the Navy had a lot of experience in
above water missions, these pilots had an effective presence on the American coast.
Compared to the other American Air Forces in anti-submarine operations, the Navy,
when effective, excelled at destroying submersibles; however, in the overall scheme of
U-Boat attacks, Navy pilots’ skills remained rudimentary for the first few months of the
war. The Navy credited their aviators with the first two submersible kills of the war and
the only air power credited with a kill in the first six months of 1942. Specifically, Navy
was credited with five U-Boat kills in the first six months of 1942. This six-month stretch
had the least amount of kills in the entire war.21
Since the Navy needed help in patrolling the Atlantic, two other protagonists, the
Army Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol joined the battle. Focusing on the failures of all
of these forces adequately explains the effect training had in Atlantic operations. The
Army Air Force had trained pilots operating before the attack on Pearl Harbor as well.
These men knew how to properly navigate and use their equipment essential in
submersible warfare. Like their naval counterparts, the United States sent these trained
aviators to Pacific bases to protect American interests.22
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Due to the unexpected service of AAF in anti-submarine operations, the AAF
rushed to create a training curriculum. The United States did not establish the Army Air
Force until 20 June 1941. With Hitler’s military conquests in Europe, the United States
began to prepare for war. The United States Army Air Corps, later renamed the Army Air
Force, trained their pilots for war.23 The United States’ Government needed qualified
pilots incase the war in Europe or Asia spilled over to the Americas. The rush to produce
aircrews caused the training system to develop while pilots attended training school.
“Facilities were secured, teachers were hired, and textbooks were written while the first
classes were being held.”24 This disorganization demonstrates the chaotic situation that
the Army Air Force dealt with as they attempted to prepare their forces for combat.
The large increase in aviators did not help strengthen the Air Corps, because the
training facilities needed more time to prepare for more pilots.. The training facilities
struggled to properly train their aviators by the program’s earlier deadline.25 The Army
Air Corps had to choose whether they wanted more pilots training with them, or fewer
and more prepared graduates. The written work, “Combat Crew and Unit Training in the
AAF” responds to this difficult decision: “Time is pressing and it is not available for
turning out individuals who meet the standards of perfection which have been set up in
the past under a peacetime program.”26 Aircrews rushed through their training in order to
increase the strength of the Army Air Force. This urgency to commission more and more
pilots caused the skill of these aviators to worsen, compared to aviators in service years
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before Pearl Harbor. The United States focused too much on increasing their numbers
than developing their pilots’ readiness.
The organization of training in the Army Air Corps also suffered in the years
leading up to Pearl Harbor, because the command structures separated prior to 1942. The
Army Air Corps made a few improvements, prior to Pearl Harbor but the organization
slowly decentralized.27 This division of power further complicated the preparation of
these pilots. This decentralization of training facilities caused overlap between the
different groups. In the summer of 1941, the Chief of the Training and Operations
Division complained to the Chief of the Air Corps that some training actions occurred
without his knowledge.28 These webs of divisions and groups demonstrate the
complexities and confusion that took place in AAF training facilities right before the war
began.
The sharp increase in personnel and the unexpected U-Boat successes off coastal
waters created a problem of equipping early training facilities for anti-submarine pilots,
specifically for AAF pilots. The United States did not have large numbers of ships or
airplanes to protect the entire Eastern Coast.29 When industries built airplanes and other
machines, the military sent them to the front lines and not to the training programs. This
resulted in the aviators’ unfamiliarity with the technology. President Franklin Roosevelt
wrote to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in May 1942 about the lack of planes for
aircrews. Roosevelt stated, “Today it is evident that under current arrangements the U.S.
27
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is going to have increasingly trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for
them to use.”30 General Arnold, of the Army Air Force, described that when facilities did
not have the equipment to train their students, the instructors “were somewhat in the
position of a man teaching another to swim by showing him a glass of water…”31 During
this time, training facilities had problems with providing the necessary equipment to give
their pilots a realistic experience before they left for war.
Even in early 1943, training areas still had trouble with giving their students
proper instruction in anti-submarine tactics and techniques. The monthly intelligence
report for the Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command gave details on this situation.
“Too often badly needed training is delayed because a lack of equipment which should be
provided but which cannot be obtained without considerable delay.”32 In one case
training squadrons had to use sunken ships or floating trailers for bomb training.33 One
reason for this disorganization deals with the divide between the Navy and Army Air
Force’s jurisdiction before the war.
Before the Second World War pilots did not have experience in basic skills
essential in the Atlantic. The responsibilities of each branch determined the training pilots
received. The Navy accepted the burden of protecting and attacking targets in the water
while the Army focused on engaging targets over land. When the Navy called upon the
help of the Army Air Force to protect the American coasts, the Army worked outside its
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element. The Army Air Force did not even have a group specifically assigned for
attacking submersibles until the United States asked them to help.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the unprepared I Bomber Command, started to
protect the American coast.34 In the first volume of “The Army Air Forces in World War
II,” the authors write, “It is hardly surprising, then, that Army planes at first flew in
search of U-Boats armed with demolition bombs instead of depth bombs and manned by
crews who were ill trained in naval identification or in the techniques of attacking
submersible targets.”35 The pilots who had the equipment useful in attacking
submersibles primarily trained in bombing operations instead of in anti-submarine
warfare.36 These men needed both the proper teaching and the necessary experience to
operate effectively. It is no surprise that the German submersibles caused so much havoc
on the American Eastern shoreline. Fortunately AAF pilots received extensive flight
training that taught them the ins and outs of their aircraft.
Trainee pilots went through a twelve-week program before they moved on to
more specific flying classes based on their future operations. The first stage comprised of
both ground and air instructions. Ground instructions contained training in: tactical
orientation, military training, indoctrination and familiarization, airplane and engine
maintenance, signal communications, armament, instruments, link trainer, meteorology,
dead reckoning navigation, and chemical. Classes lasted 168 hours total. For air
instructions, the classes consisted of training in: familiarization and transition, individual
navigation, formation, night flying, and instrument flying. These classes lasted for 48
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hours total.37 The specialized training after this program did not include patrol bombing
since the AAF never figured they had to operate in the Atlantic. Compared to the Civil
Air Patrol pilots, AAF pilots had better training and abilities for anti-submarine warfare.
The Civil Air Patrol, like the AAF, did not expect to take such an important role
in the Battle of the Atlantic. Before these planes flew armed, the Civil Air Patrol pilots
successfully scared the U-Boats into submerging.38 The moment these pilots started to
bring weapons on their plane, they patrolled as a submarine attacker. In analyzing Civil
Air Patrol pilots as submarine attackers, their lack of proper training explained the failure
of these pilots to sink the U-Boats. Training had little to do with making a submersible
hide and wait below the water. It is true that when a U-Boat operated below the surface
they moved so slow that a merchant vessel could outrun their attacker. The submersible
would still be operational and it could also sink more merchant vessels once the plane
flew away.
For roughly a year the Civil Air Patrol protected cargo ships against U-Boats, but
these pilots did little to destroy the enemy submersibles. The CAP contained thousands of
workers in this organization and their pilots flew tens of thousand of hours.
Unfortunately, CAP pilots failed to give the German U-Boats a reason to retreat. One
source does not even credit the Civil Air Patrol pilots with a single kill.39 Several reasons
explain this statistic. Lack of equipment, technology and also training could all be
attributed to the poor performance in destroying submersibles. Samuel Morison writes
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about how veterans of the First World War serving as CAP pilots in 1942 did not know
how to use the instruments for flying.40 Inexperience attributed pilots’ struggle in antisubmarine warfare. Some of these aviators trained in World War I and some had
hundreds of flying hours under their belt. However, compared to military pilots, CAP
veterans had little impact in sinking U-Boats. Lack of training and experience hindered
the effectiveness of CAP pilots.
Anti-submarine pilots needed hands on experience to find and fix some of the
problems encountered on patrol missions, which U.S. pilots failed to have at the
beginning of the war. Early training left out certain methods of anti-submarine tactics,
because pilots did not discover all the problems of patrolling the Atlantic. As the aircrews
flew on more and more missions, anti-submarine units improved. In early bombings of
German U-Boats, Army Air Force pilots killed many marine animals. Aviators at times,
mixed up the water disruption of a shark with a submersible periscope.41 These mistakes
can be attributed to a lack of knowledge in what the U-Boats look like, and on the
aircrews’ lack of patience during coastal patrols.
Patrolling any body of water for submersibles during World War II consisted of
both sailors and airmen searching for hundreds of hours without spotting anything useful.
Morison wrote how the people patrolling the Atlantic grew more and more anxious. They
spotted a U-Boat in every wave they saw or heard.42 Also, when a German submersible
escaped an attack, pilots grew impatient and moved on to search different parts of the
Atlantic. They later found out that they could leave and come back soon after and the U-
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Boat resurfaced.43 From these examples, experience formed an aspect of training. In this
regard training and subsequent improvement developed over time. The novice level of
the pilots in operational missions becomes a reason why aviators failed in the first few
months of the war to protect the United States war machine. Proper experience consisted
of better techniques, but also more advanced technologies.
The difference in technology hurt pilots in anti-submarine missions. In the first
few months of the war, aviators slowly advanced their proficiency in the new forms of
detection and attacking technologies. The pilots in anti-submarine operations learned
these varying technologies to defeat the U-Boats. Also with the incorporation of new
ways to find and sink U-Boats, every pilot needed to learn how to properly use them.
Every soldier in ocean operations understood the importance in developing
technologies to track their enemy. Throughout World War II, militaries installed
technologies, such as radar, in countless ships and planes. Radar sends a series of
electronic pulses and a monitor displays an icon based on the signals that bounce back.44
Radar allowed aircrews to locate nearby U-Boats at any time of day. This became
extremely important in the aircraft’s ability to spot German submersibles at night, a time
where U-Boats could hide themselves from detection. The British forces, before
America’s entry into World War II, first used radar. Their development and training with
this new technology enabled them to make an impact in both the Battle of Britain and the
Battle of the Atlantic.
Pilots needed to train in the proper operation of this equipment to find any
submersibles. Aviators had trouble with radar in 1942 when planes started to receive this
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technology. Admiral Doenitz analyzed the use of radar against his own forces. Through
experience, U-Boat crews realized that staying close to convoys confused Allied aviators
since they were “unable with their locating gear to tell the difference between their own
ships and our U-Boats.”45 Aircrews additionally needed to sink a U-Boat once they found
them.
Success in anti-submarine warfare required pilots to learn attacking technologies
to defeat the U-Boat. These weapons in the end destroyed the German submersible. The
military used depth charges as a common way to sink a submersible. A depth charge is a
bomb that explodes once it has reached a certain distance underwater. In the first year of
World War II, America pilots used depth charges as a key method of attacking a
submersible. After the First World War, the United States thought that their methods of
destroying a U-Boat in 1918 would still effectively sink a submersible over twenty years
later.46
Due to the underdeveloped depth charge and the lack of proper bombsights to
accurately drop them, the pilots did little to damage the U-Boats for most of 1942. The
process of dropping a depth charge consisted of using a “seaman’s eye” to accurately
release their armament.47 Aircrews estimated the location of a submerged U-Boat based
on the speed of the submersible and the speed of their aircraft. Aviators had trouble doing
much damage to German submersibles because they could not see the U-Boat they
attacked and they inaccurately assumed where the submersible operated. Due to the basic
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nature of the weapon, aircrews needed to use their expertise on the accurate use of depth
charges.
Pilots needed training in order to assess the right spot to drop their depth charges.
Charles Sternhell’s “Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II,” describes the importance
of training in bombing accuracy. In this book, Sternhell shows how pilots who dropped
more than ten practice bombs the month before, had sixty-five percent of their attacks
categorized as good and only fifteen percent as poor. Pilots who dropped less than ten
practice bombs had fifty-one percent of their attacks classified as good and thirty-six
percent as poor.48 In 1942 aircrews only started to use these technologies, and many
others, to sink U-Boats. These pilots had little experienced in the use detection and
attacking systems like radar and depth charges. Only after months of practice did aviators
start damaging the German submersible consistently.
In conclusion, in the first half of 1942 the situation in the Atlantic reached a new
low. Even though America worked to improve the effectiveness of coastal patrols once
they realized their weaknesses, the U-Boat still put America’s shoreline in to chaos up
until August 1942. The Germans decimated America’s merchant ships with only a few
ships of their own. In January 1942, the Germans had ninety-one operational U-Boats. Of
those ninety-one, only a minute amount of submersibles operated on the American
shoreline. Despite the fact that the Germans built more and more submersibles to use
against the Allies throughout the war, they never sank as many cargo ships off the
American coast as they did in the first six months of 1942.49 The U-Boats massacred
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Allied shipping for the majority of 1942, despite the fact that they had a limited amount
of operational U-Boats. This is because the Allied forces, specifically aircrews, failed to
give Admiral Doenitz a good reason to retreat. In 1942, only four percent of American
airplane attacks did lethal damage to the U-Boat.50 German U-Boats significantly
damaged American shipping vessels, with little loss on their own side because the United
States failed to have trained and experienced pilots taking part in anti-submarine warfare.
Due to the United States’ obligation to protect both their East and West coasts, the
United States Navy ordered many trained aviators to the Pacific theater. When Germany
began Operation Drumbeat, the current Naval forces did not have the strength to protect
American shipping. Instead of having Naval aircrews, which prepared for patrol
missions, the United States received improvised aid from the Army Air Force and Civil
Air Patrol.
The Army Air Force unexpectedly joined the Battle of the Atlantic. This force
had a responsibility to protect the American mainland. With the Naval aircrews separated
between oceans, the AAF sent pilots to the Atlantic. These men had no previous training
in patrols over water nor did they receive the necessary training once they operated off
the American coastline. AAF pilots trained primarily in bombardment, making
techniques in anti-submarine warfare a secondary importance. Although the training in
the AAF suffered, their curriculum surpassed that of the civilian forces known as the
CAP.
As the Civil Air Patrol joined the AAF in patrolling the Atlantic, these pilots
needed more training in flying and navigation. The men chosen to fly failed to meet the
qualifications that permitted them to join the United States’ armed forces. Thus, when
50
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they volunteered to patrol the Atlantic to support the Army and Navy, CAP pilots
struggled to do any damage to the German submersibles. They needed proper training, in
the tactics and technologies of anti-submarine warfare.
In the first months of the Battle of the Atlantic, the United States’ air forces
incorrectly implemented the technologies at their disposal. Radar only just reached a
level where it could be used on an aircraft. Depth charges changed little from the First
World War and the American pilots needed a bombsight to drop them accurately. All to
often, aircrews eyeballed the distance of a U-Boat and guessed the right time to drop a
bomb. Pilots needed experience in attacking submersibles to effectively damage a UBoat.
Finally, aircrews not only needed experience in detecting and attacking
technologies but training in anti-submarine warfare in general. The Allies needed crews
ready for the hours of mind numbing flight where aircrews looked into the vast ocean, for
any ripples in the water or a surfaced U-Boat. At that time the plane only had seconds to
make an attack before the submersible submerges. All of these failures provoked the
United States into trying an alternate method in an effort to improve aircrews. As a result,
civilian scientists joined the U.S. military to analyze these inadequacies of aircrews.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTELLECTUAL ADJUSTMENTS:
DEVELOPING TACTICS THROUGH SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT1
We have seen in the previous chapter that American aircrews had
immense trouble in surprising Admiral Doenitz’s U-Boats. Now we will look at
who solved the complications that plagued the American forces, both civilian and
military, that patrolled the coast. The fiasco for Allied forces, known as the
“Second Happy Time” by the German commanders, did such incredible damage
to Allied shipping that the United States Government scrambled to find answers.
How could U-Boats sink this many merchant vessels? Why were aircrews
ineffective at protecting Allied cargo? What needed to be changed for military
personnel to have a greater impact on German strategy? Civilian scientists worked
to explain these problems
The Navy took the initiative in utilizing civilian analysts in anti-submarine
warfare. Admiral Ernest King, of the United States Navy, instituted the
Antisubmarine Warfare Unit to study the German U-Boats and possible defenses.2
Looking back, these scientists that specialized in operational analysis improved
the training and experiences of American aircrews. They not only worked on the
creation of new technologies, but also the proper uses of the technologies,
1
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techniques and tactics in anti-submarine operations. Since the production of new
technologies did little by itself to help in training Allied aviators, I will focus on
how analysts found more efficient ways of using existing resources. Operational
analysts implemented a relatively unused art to fix the anti-submarine mess.
Before this crisis in the Atlantic, adjustments made from scientific research aided
other situations in the 20th century.
In the United States, operations research, specifically in the Navy, existed
for many years before the Second World War. Some of the few attempts to use
scientists in military operations occurred in 1906 and from 1917-1918, for air
combat and anti-submarine operations respectively.3 During the Second World
War, operational analysis showed off its potential in Great Britain early in World
War II. The successful assistance by scientists influenced the Allies to take
advantage of their intellectual citizenry.
After German forces started to attack Great Britain on her own land, the
future of the Allied forces looked bleak. Great Britain raced to find anything to
give them the advantage in the war. Once France fell in 1940, Germany increased
its attacks on Great Britain. The new Axis objective, where the German Luftwaffe
tried to obtain air superiority and compromise the morale of the British people
evolved into the famous Battle of Britain. Over several months, German airplanes
bombed major cities in England to make the pending Nazi invasion successful. In
this battle, Germany had the advantage of numbers, location and time of attack.4
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As the aggressor in the battle, the Luftwaffe chose where they wanted to bomb,
putting the British pilots on the defensive. Along these lines, the German pilots
also decided when to attack, forcing British pilots to remain vigilant at all hours
of the day. Finally, due to the fact that the Luftwaffe contained more pilots than
the RAF, German forces could swarm any defending plane.
During the Battle of Britain, the British military discovered the advantages
of operational research. British scientists improved techniques in intercepting
enemy aircraft.5 P.M.S. Blackett, a professor at the University of Manchester, and
known as the father of operations research, wrote how once he started to help the
RAF that, “Relatively too much scientific effort has been expended hitherto in the
production of new devices and too little in the proper use of what we have got.”6
Great Britain focused too much on developing new weapons that they overlooked
how they could improve their current weapons. After Blackett’s realization, more
effort in mastering current resources occurred. In the early years of the Battle of
the Atlantic, operational researchers in Britain analyzed search methods to
account for their lack of submersibles spotted.7 American scientists, after visiting
England, accepted and adopted operational research as a key reason for Britain’s
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victory in the Battle of Britain.8 America soon followed Great Britain’s footsteps
and created a scientific division of their own.
Throughout the war, America created several groups that used scientists to
help the war effort. Some of these divisions worked specifically on antisubmarine warfare. The establishment of the National Defense Research
Committee (NDRC), in June 1940, organized scientists and researchers to aide in
the extensive operations conducted by American forces before and after Pearl
Harbor.9 They defined their scope of activities as
…concerned with scientific research on and development of new
instrumentalities or materials of war, or of new materials or
methods to be used primarily in the manufacture of instruments of
war; and of the improvement of existing instrumentalities or
materials of war, or of existing material or methods to be used
primarily in the manufacture of instruments of war.10
The NDRC took the first steps in improving how servicemen use their weapons in
the Second World War.
This committee worked with both the Navy and the Army Air Force to
improve their technologies. When it came to Naval operations, the Antisubmarine
Warfare Operations Research Group (ASWORG), a division of the NDRC,
helped to solve any problem associated with German U-Boats. This included the
development of technologies but also, following Blackett’s pervious epiphany on
the definition of Operational research, to improve how seaman and aviators used
these weapons, The operations research division of the Army Air Force, the Sea
8
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Search and Attack Development Unit (SADU), operated independently from the
NDRC unlike ASWORG. They still worked closely with the NDRC and their
operational research divisions.11 The SADU, created at Langley Field, to study the
attacking methods and technology in anti-submarine operations.12 In the middle of
1942, ASWORG sent field analysts to SADU to help in any way.13 This move
attempted to improve the methods and discoveries of each division. The
intercommunication between these two divisions no doubt allowed for new
theories to spread, strengthening their analysis. ASWORG grew into one of the
primary groups dedicated to implementing scientific methods in the Battle of the
Atlantic.
When the German U-Boats began to ravage the American coast from
January until September 1942, operational analysis showed its full potential in
anti-submarine operations. In March 1942, the United States established the
Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group. This group, led by MIT
physicist Philip Morse, one of the prominent figures in operations research in
America, worked to help the Navy in their current difficulties. Since ASWORG
began quite late, compared to the other programs that requested the aid of
scientists, Morse had a more difficult task in recruiting fellow colleagues. Once
Morse assembled his team, they immediately started to work together quite
productively because they, “came from similar background and talked the same
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language.”14 These civilian scientists first studied the basic concerns of antisubmarine operations and then they worked to find some solutions.15
When it came to anti-submarine warfare, the Antisubmarine Warfare
Operations Research Group studied how the U-Boats escaped detection. Morse
writes how, “If the submarine is dangerous because it is hard to find, then the
process of finding the submarine is an important part of the counteraction.16” Of
the two forces that spotted a U-Boat, from either a ship or an airplane, ASWORG
researched the use of the latter as the way to patrol for a surfaced submersible.
Airplanes covered a larger area in less time than their ship counterparts. Aircraft
research in anti-submarine operations helped impede U-Boat missions because
these submersibles actually spent much time at the surface where it operated at a
higher level.17 German U-Boats moved faster above the water, the fresh air
recharged their batteries and improved the morale of their personnel. With the
Germans moving above the surface of the water, the Allies had a greater chance
of sinking these now vulnerable submersibles. Once ASWORG decided on this
specific aspect of anti-submarine operations to focus on, they started to ask the
important questions. “How far away could a surfaced submersible be seen? And
were they always seen? What percentage of the time were they missed?18” The
answers to these questions improved the skills of Allied pilots in search and attack
missions. Answering these questions was not the only obstacle faced by
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operational researchers. They also needed to prove their worth to their Naval
superiors.
The Navy took some time to accept the idea of using civilians to improve
military troubles. The Navy did not think that non-military personnel could aid
them in Naval operations. Philip Morse commented on these strict policies of the
Navy; “To let nonmilitary persons participate in even minor operational decisions
was, of course, heretical to many officers, especially those of the Navy…”19 The
Naval work force sent their personnel, qualified in anti-submarine warfare, in
operations that did not have them studying the U-Boat war.20 These men worked
on expanding a Navy that had to fight a two-ocean war.21 This caused a need by
the Navy to find intelligent men to conduct research. Also, in early 1942, no other
organization had enough people that knew enough about mathematical methods to
extract helpful solutions.22 The Navy thought, once they granted scientists the
chance to help, that they would follow along with the Navy’s work ethic. Morse
describes this presumption by saying, “I suppose we were expected to file quietly
in, to studiously digest all the reports, and once in a while to merge to deliver
some oracular pronouncement…”23
This feeling of separation between the scientists and the United States
Navy extended further when Admiral Francis Low, of the Tenth Fleet, refused to
tell the majority of the civilian scientists where some of their information was
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derived. ASWORG members voiced their opposition to the “Navy’s refusal to
make us members of the family.”24 It did not take a lot of time for the military to
notice the importance of having scientists analyze their field operations, because
of the growing failures of American forces. Toward the end of the war Admiral
King stated, “Only by continuing vigorous research and development can this
country hope to be protected from any potential enemies and maintain the position
which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effective naval fighting force in
history.”25 Even though the military opposed trusting civilians with classified
information, over time the formulas made by scientific researchers showed
potential for improvement.
As a method that these civilian scientists took when they started to observe
a specific problem in detail they asked, “What course of action will best
accomplish my objective?”26 Once these analysts started to research a problem in
detail, they had to consider the same questions before they proceeded.
a. What objective is to be achieved? b. What different courses of action
(alternatives) are available? c. What factors (variables) will contribute to
the success or failure of each possible course of action in achieving the
objective? d. What yardstick can be used to measure and compare the
effectiveness of the different alternatives?27
On the question of the objective, scientists had to discover the right
problem to answer. Depending on the question one asks, the statistical evidence
can either help or hurt your argument. This focus led to different strategies and
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how researchers analyzed statistical data. For example, the addition of antiaircraft (AA) guns on British merchant vessels to protect themselves from Axis
aircraft demonstrated how certain questions contain different answers. Once cargo
crews used AA weapons against the Germans Luftwaffe, operational analysts
noticed that cargo ships shot down four percent of attacking airplanes. If
operational scientists wanted to study amount of German aircraft destroyed as
their objective, then a four percent success rate does not demonstrate that these
weapons worked. Logically these civilians would conclude to stop fitting cargo
ships with AA guns. Looking deeper in this situation, researchers realized that
although only four percent of Axis aircraft crashed in their attacks, ships fitted
with these weapons protected themselves more so than those without. Twenty five
percent of cargo ships sank when they did not have any protection while only ten
percent of cargo ships sank with AA guns. When those researchers viewed the
safety of Allied vessels as their objective, the fifteen percent difference showed
that even though crews did not sink many airplanes, AA guns should be fitted on
more cargo vessels.28 Therefore with this example, the objective achieved and the
yardstick used to measure its success discovered the most efficient solution to a
given dilemma. Also the other questions asked by scientists usually helped in the
decision making of other obstacles.
ASWORG effectively analyzed the issues and answered the questions in
anti-submarine operations by sending field agents to study these obstacles first
hand. The use of field agents supported the improvement of operations analysis
because, “…they would work with the users of new weapons, could apply ideas
28
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for new tactics in practice, and could recognize new problems to be transmitted to
the central body for further work.”29 ASWORG sent field agents to frontiers all
around the United States and abroad. This allowed for analysts to understand the
finer points of anti-submarine warfare. First-hand accounts also helped scientists
discover problems specific to each area. Once U-Boats started to sink significant
numbers of merchant vessels in a certain area, ASWORG sent members there to
conduct research. Two analysts, Arthur Kip and William Shockley visited the
Gulf Sea Frontier a month after that area lost 220,000 gross tons of cargo to four
U-Boats.30 In November, when the U-Boats moved towards the Mid-Atlantic
Gap, an area in the Northern Atlantic far from any airstrip, ASWORG sent
researchers Maurice Bell and John Pellam to Newfoundland.31 ASWORG
researchers, once they gained the needed information, started to notice common
problems and later gave their input.
In 1943, ASWORG reported on the failures of aircrews in anti-submarine
attacks during 1942, and more specifically, from July until December. They
realized the extent of the failures made by aircrews patrolling the Atlantic.
Aircrews, ASWORG discovered, that of all the attacks made in 1942, the Navy
only characterized four percent of them lethal. In the last six months of 1942,
patrolling pilots improved their percentage to a feeble five percent. Their report
below explains the reasons behind why pilots failed to sink a lurking U-Boat.
From this data, ASWORG scientists worked on finding different solutions.32
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REASONS FOR FAILURE OF ATTACK
(Aircraft Attacks on U-boats, Assessed as Resulting in No Damage)
A.

Attack Delivered Too Late
U-boat detected plane at too great a distance . ........ .
Too slow in executing attack.
Insufficient opportunity to make attack
.............
....
............
Reason undeterminable ......

8
5
1
4
18

B.

C.

D.

E.

Tactical Errors
Bombing error . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
.
Insufficient number of bombs dropped.
.
. . . . . .
. . .
Fuze setting too deep . .
.....................
.
Poorly coordinated attack, evidencing insufficient experience
.
Mechanical Failures
Bombs failed to release
....
....... . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Firing switch failed to opperate
.
Intervalometer failure. . ................
....
.
Rack failure ...................
Depth Bomb duds .......... . . ............
.
Inadequate night illumination . .................
Miscellaneous
.
. .
. .
. . . . . . . . ...
Attacked oil slick.
Disappearing radar contact, attacked swirl
.................
Neither A/S equipment nor personnel
. . . . . . .
. . . . . .
Insufficient data to permit analysis. . ..............
Total . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. ..

29
3
3
4

2
2
2

.

39

6

3
1
3
1
4
20

10

28

.

95*

*In four instances, the bombing error was accompanied by mechanical failures of sufficient importance that it seemed unwise to attempt to select
a single "cause". This accounts for the total of 95.

ASWORG
categorized
a majority
of the “Reasons
a Failed
Attack”
on
A. Attack Delivered
Too Late.,
The importance
of flying for
at the
best patrol
altitudes, maintaining a vigilant lookout, and making proper use of sun, moon and cloud
in order to avoid detection by the U-boat, the importance of speed and the
pilotcover
errors.
In many of the late attacks (A), analysts stressed the necessity for
finest coordination on the part of the crew in delivering the attack, all these are
strongly reemphasized by the figures on lateness of attack found under this
heading.
pilots
to camouflage themselves.33 Also, pilots needed to learn how to properly
There were seventeen instances where the U-boat had been down so long when the

timedepth
theirbombs
attacks
so that they caught a U-Boat before it submerged. For bombing
exploded that its location could not be known with any degree of accuracy, either in plan or depth.

In eight of these attacks it was felt that the sub-

fasteston
anti-submarine
plane atblamed
a distance
such thatof
even
marine
detected the
errors,
ASWORG
explicitly
a majority
thethe
failures
training. The
plane and crew could not have arrived in time to make a successful attack. Slowness
in executing the attack (the fault 'could lie with either the crew or the
March
Intelligence
statedfive
that:cases. In addition, one attack failed when
plane)
accounted Report
for another
the depth bombs were hurriedly released on a submarine which was sighted just
four
In improvement
the remaining of
beneathopportunity
the plane. for
below
the surface directly
Unquestionably,
the greatest
theinstances, the reasons for the tardy arrival could not be determined from the
overall results of aircraft attacks on U-Boats lies in this field. And
data available.

the most important single factor affecting the accuracy of bombing is
training. A number of attacks, for instance, failed because of nothing
but "buck fever". Bomb bay doors opened too late, firing key switch
in wrong position, practice bombs dropped instead of live bombs -these are errors resulting from lack of sufficient training and
experience.34
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While these failures occurred, in 1942, operations researchers worked to identify
possible solutions.
Operations researchers analyzed the most effective uses of anti-submarine
technologies. They examined the use of the famous depth charges. They also
analyzed the most effective use of attacking techniques, like the angle and speed
of attacks. Finally, they looked at the most efficient use of anti-submarine tactics,
which included the proper conduct of patrols and proper search patterns.
Operational analysts cut the time that normal trial and error took in finding overall
problems in anti-submarine performances. This allowed training procedures and
subsequently, the aircrews still in school to improve faster
The technologies implemented by the Navy and Army Air Forces, grew in
complexity for aviators to operate. The operation analysts worked to explain how
aircrews should handle these devices. The constant development of newer
detecting and attacking technologies helped sink more U-Boats if the pilots
effectively used them. Scientists, therefore, had the responsibility to make these
weapons more productive. The weapon aircrews used depth charges to attack a
submersible in the first couple years of World War II. Of the most common
mistakes made in anti-submarine operation aircrews incorrectly set the range of
their depth.
In the first half of 1942, airplanes dropped depth charges that exploded
fifty to seventy-five feet below the surface. This setting could be lethal if the
submersible was at that depth as well. Allied destroyers set their depth charges at
a range of seventy-five feet. This allowed for the destroyer to reach a safe
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distance before their bomb exploded. Also, a stalking U-Boat moved below the
surface making a depth charge at seventy-five feet quite dangerous.35 The deeper
depth caused problems for aircraft, mainly because once a submersible reached
this target distance of seventy-five feet underwater the water camouflaged them
from their attackers. Aircrews’ accuracy in their attack run depended on their
ability to see the U-Boat. At a level where an aircrew made visual contact with a
submersible only a twenty-five foot depth charge could explode at a lethal
distance. Operational researchers concluded that the fifty-foot settings of the
depth charges caused attacks made between July and December 1942 to have only
a three percent effect.36 Morse comments on this change of depth charge settings,
“Within two months it was apparent that this change had increased the number of
attacks by a factor of about five.”37
Even if the Allied aircrews set their depth charges correctly, they still had
a problem in the aiming of these weapons. Pilots made two errors in submersible
attacks: line and range errors. Line errors resulted from the steadiness of the plane
while range errors have to do with the timing of the bomb drop. During an attack
when the bombs miss their target, The Antisubmarine Command, in charge of
anti-submarine warfare, discovered three possible reasons. The pilot could have
dropped their bomb at the wrong time, the plane could have missed flying over
the target, or both.38 When it came to line errors, pilots just needed to practice
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flying in a straight line. For range errors, scientists saw that pilots missed their
targets in greater distances than in line errors.
They found out that in missions over water, aircrews incorrectly estimated
the lead needed to drop a depth charge. The Antisubmarine Command told their
bombers to drop their charges twenty feet in front of a U-Boat so that once the
charge reached its set distance underwater the U-Boat moved in to lethal range.
Bombers flying over water ended up dropping their bombs sixty feet in front of
their target. Operational researchers looked at this mistake and concluded that
more training in water based bombing would fix this problem. In the case of range
errors, practice improved pilots, but also trainers had to specifically tell aircrews
to compensate their lead because they falsely believed their lead would sink a
target U-Boat.39 Once these weapons dropped on top of their targets, with a
proper depth set, these weapons successfully damaged or sank a submersible.
Pilots just needed to find a submersible on the surface to show off the lethality of
their improved attack.
Aircrews also learned the necessary skill of catching a U-Boat on the
water, a vulnerable position for the German crew. Too often the lookout towers
on German submersibles saw an incoming airplane and had enough to time hide
in the safety of the Ocean. Analysts commented on the tardiness of these attacks
and weighed in on ways to fix the problem. Pilots had to learn was how to hide
themselves from their prey, as a technique to surprise a U-Boat.
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As explained earlier, a fully submerged submersible had several directions
to move in order to dodge any weapon. Therefore the pilots also had to spot the
submersible first. In the fall of 1941, English analysts discovered that at least
sixty percent of U-Boats had already seen an Allied airplane before the same
plane spotted the submersible.40 Therefore to surprise their target U-Boat,
aircrews not only had to stay hidden from possible U-Boats but they also needed
to be the first one to spot their target.
In order to catch a U-Boat, pilots had to find a submersible earlier in their
search. This allowed for pilots to line up with their target and make an effective
attack run while the submersible sailed through the water unsuspectingly.
Operational analysts commented on was how aircrews could find a U-Boat faster
than before. Researchers established a technique in which height proved a
powerful variable in searching for submersibles. These scientists worked on the
myth of the proper height an aircraft needed fly in order to spot a submersible.
Scientists in England found that the higher a plane searched, the more targets an
aircrew found. The United States did not immediately listen to this advice because
commanders worried that the higher a plane flew, the lower probability the pilot
could make a fast and effective attack run. Scientists later worked to disprove this
assumption.41
Aircrews also improved a technique to make sure the Germans did not
spot their plane before they had enough time to attack. Pilots had to use their
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surroundings for camouflage.42 In one example, operations analysts wrote how
pilots needed to fly in and out of the clouds around them to get a better jump on a
submersible.43 Analysts also discovered that when a plane flew behind the sun,
enemy units spotted much more Allied aircraft because of the contrast in color.44
On the contrary, during night attacks, pilots would dive on a submersible with the
help of the moonlight.45 Surprise attacks allow for aircrews to properly aim their
weapons on a submersible. Once a U-Boat fully submerged itself, Allied pilots
could only guess to its location. Aircrews only dropped their weapons accurately
when they compensated their drop where they expected a U-Boat to move
through, at the time of detonation. Therefore the submergence of a target
submersible, also known as ‘blind time’ affected the allowance pilots gave on
their drop. Operational researchers commented how, “The effect of a long blind
time will be especially serious in aircraft attacks since there is no information as
to the target’s course and speed except visual estimation…”46 The use of attacking
techniques increased the chance of finding a surfaced U-Boat. Catching a
submersible on the surface thus made aircrews incredibly more deadly.
In some cases pilots failed in anti-submarine operations because their
strategies ineffectively searched the Atlantic. Pilots used to search for U-Boats in
short distances and would leave early after an unsuccessful attack. Civilian
scientists worked to find the most statistically efficient pattern for their airplanes.
42
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This included the amount of area a given plane could search, and how many
aircraft a given operation needed to find a surfaced U-Boat.47
A proper search pattern allowed for more sightings and attacks on UBoats. However, aircrews needed to conduct searches that could find a
submersible that escaped below the water. Too often pilots would acknowledge
that their attack failed and then they would search the area briefly before flying
away. In December 1942 operations analysts wrote about a pilot who dove on a
U-Boat too late and in response, flew in a wide circle in cloud cover until the
submersible resurfaced.48 The success of this sortie credited the aircrews’ tactic,
making this method of attack beneficial for many different commands. This
improvement helped to make new aircrews more efficient. With the
implementation of baiting tactics, pilots had multiple chances to damage their
target submersible.
Operations researchers also confirmed ideas held by many experienced
pilots. Aviators had a feeling that the closer towards shore a plane searched, the
less likely the chance that they would find a submersible. This is because a UBoat remained submerged for as long as they could once they operated close to
any shoreline.49 This made conducting searches further from base enticing and
more common.
Training made aircrews effective in the Atlantic. Operations researchers
gave the crucial advice essential for these new pilots. This gave training programs
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more information to teach their students, finally making them the deadly force the
military expected from them. Once ASWORG members discovered a problem
made by most aircrews, they recommended how to fix it. Training programs then
implemented this correction, making new aviators that much better. William
Shockley, a scientist in ASWORG noticed how aircrews only had, on average,
one opportunity to sink a submersible in their “active life”.50 The active life of an
aircrew is the amount of time a crew is together before the military sent them to
other duties, killed or wounded.
Due to the lack of time for each aircrew to improve from their own
experiences, the military need to report any discovery in anti-submarine warfare
to have these techniques and tactics implemented in training. Experience is a great
way to improve any military force. Sadly, because of the short active life of
aircrews, the Army Air Force and the Navy could only benefit as a whole from
the realizations made by pilots instead of the individual aircrews. This is one of
the reasons why civilian scientists impacted anti-submarine training and the skill
of operational aircrews. In the Battle of the Atlantic, tactics and techniques
constantly changed and adapted to give one side a greater advantage. Operations
researchers had to catch the U-Boat as the German Navy started to implement
different strategies and subsequently develop new techniques for their pilots.51
New aviators and those in the field needed to regularly learn new tactics. Training
programs started to improve as the war continued. “…it is now possible for the
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entire crew of a submersible to rehearse approaches and torpedo attacks against
enemy task forces in trainers on dry land…”52
In conclusion, after the insurmountable amount of merchant vessels lost in
the first several months after Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy needed
answers. Although the Navy did not want to work closely with civilian scientists,
they realized that these researchers knew how to figure out the solutions necessary
to turn the tides in the Battle of the Atlantic. ASWORG, after its creation,
analyzed technologies, techniques, and tactics of aircrews. American scientists not
only created newer technologies to be fitted on patrol craft but found the proper
way to use existing ones. The settings of the old depth charge improved. When it
came to techniques, the use of their natural surroundings helped to make their
attacks lethal. The tactics of a useful search pattern then allowed for the Allies to
spot a U-Boat. As scientists realized each of these new developments, new
aircrews benefitted. An aircrew only had one opportunity to sink a U-Boat and
because of this, the military made sure new trainees knew all the tricks on their
missions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AN OVERWHELMING IMPROVEMENT:
ALLIED REFORM AND AXIS DEFEAT1
After the middle of 1942, America’s effectiveness in the Battle of the Atlantic
improved. No longer could German U-Boats scout the United States coastline without
worrying about their safety. Even in missions in the North Atlantic, German submersibles
preferred to attack a convoy once they moved outside the range of any patrol plane.
Improvements in the pilots and the organization command helped America changed the
tides of the Battle of the Atlantic. After extensive analysis, aircrews perfected the tactics
and techniques of anti-submarine operations, making their attacks more numerous and
lethal.
The United States used the advice of the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations
Research Group to develop the detecting and attacking aspects of anti-submarine
operations. The American military also reformed their command structure to adequately
train aircrews for patrolling missions. In this progression, Naval and Army Air Force
aviators corrected many of the problems that plagued American aircrews in early 1942.
The Army Air Force realized the need to graduate pilots who had more education.
This educational awakening contained both an improvement in the selection of cadets and
a correction to the curriculum for pilots. After these changes, the Army Air Force
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accepted men who showed promise in the strains of flying. Also these pilots attended
classes that incorporated training in anti-submarine operations.
Reorganization of the commands in charge of training helped to coordinate the
methodology and structure of schooling cadets. This reform coupled with the educational
corrections established an air force ready to fight the German submersibles. Both the
Army and Navy fixed their problems and operated in the Atlantic with great
accomplishment.
These solutions made American forces in the Atlantic able to pressure the German
submersibles and even make them retreat to safer waters. The aircrews’ abilities to attack
a U-Boat and, more importantly, sink the same submersible increased immensely since
their early failures in 1942. These successes forced the German commanders to operate in
areas away from high merchant traffic or of any military importance. By August 1943 the
scene in the Atlantic saw a complete reversal. German U-Boats no longer influenced
Allied operations.
The Army restructured their commands with the creation of the Army Air Force
Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). Before this division, the I Bomber Command
picked up the slack for the Navy. Sadly, this command primarily operated in bombing
missions and not in anti-submarine patrol. With the AAFAC, pilots trained specifically in
the skills necessary for anti-submarine warfare. The Navy followed suit and created an
anti-submarine warfare unit.
After the German U-Boats moved to the North Atlantic in late 1942 and
subsequently sank tons of cargo vessels away from the air umbrella that previously
protected them, the United States Navy established a command devoted to patrolling the
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Atlantic. The Tenth Fleet organized the operation and training of patrol units, since the
Navy increased the amount of pilots ready for combat. A larger pool of pilots allowed for
the Navy and AAF to greatly improve on their current cadets. This included a more
rigorous entry examination and more developed training.
The United States’ improvements to the organization of training and the specific
curriculum for pilots coincided with their growing success in the Atlantic. Now pilots and
cadets received accurate and coordinated training that shaped them into a deadly unit.
Since both operating pilots and ASWORG scientists at this point identified impressive
strategies in response to America’s earlier inexperience in anti-submarine warfare. First
the Army Air Force, who conducted a significant amount of patrolling missions, required
the selection of capable pilots.
In 1942 the Army Air Force changed the way that they chose possible cadets for
training. The Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination improved the format of the
questions. From 1942-1943 the AAF created questions to observe whether or not the
student could learn vocabulary and scenarios expected of a pilot. For example, instead of
asking a student to find the fourth power of one plus the square root of negative one, the
test asks the student to determine how long it would take for two planes of different
speeds to reach a certain distance from one another.2 Due to this new objective the AAF
cancelled the need for any education experience.3 From this selection overhaul, Army Air
Force cadets had relevant knowledge for flying missions.
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After the Army Air Force found a talented pool of cadets, these new pilots needed
more accurate training in anti-submarine warfare. When the AAF realized that they had
to patrol the U.S. coast for U-Boats, they implemented a new training program devoted to
prepare pilots with this new operation. Pilots trained with the Operational Training Unit
for four weeks. This course consisted of “B-24 transition, bombing and gunnery,
navigation and practice patrol.”4 This class analogous with Naval training qualified
aircrews for anti-submarine operations. After completing the course, pilots understood
many of the technologies and techniques of ASW.
The Army also incorporated an intensive bombing program in 1943. The
Antisubmarine Command Training Directive coordinated the tasks during this program as
a way to improve the bombing accuracy of anti-submarine pilots. Throughout the training
regiment, pilots practice flying in the clouds while using their radar to position
themselves for an attack. The pilots then move on to Naval exercises where they sharpen
their attacks on a submerging submersible. Colonel Halverson of the 26th Air Wing
commented on this form of training: “This kind of training boosts combat crew morale
tremendously. Working first with a simulated U-Boat, and finally with an actual
submarine, gives each crew member confidence and the feeling that any enemy
submarine he meets will never meet another 26th AWIG plane!”5
Throughout the training operations, the results are recorded in an effort to allow the
pilots to see their attacks and for the operations researchers to analyze them. During the
pilots’ practice drops on a target, a tail gunner plots where the bombs landed and also
cameras in the plane take pictures of the drop. These pictures helped the pilot see where
4
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his charges ended up. While these exercises occur, an adjoining plane filmed the attack
and the pilot saw the results of the exercise. The Plans and Training Section later received
the film for analysis.6
Although all of these corrections in the teaching of new pilots prepared cadets for
the complexities of anti-submarine operations, the Army Air Force and the Navy had to
also organize their efforts against the U-Boats by creating a command with the sole
responsibility of anti-submarine warfare. Throughout 1942, a large variety of forces
conducted anti-submarine patrols. Of the forces involved, none had the strength to take
control of anti-submarine operations. The Army Air Force started to restructure in the fall
of 1942 for an anti-submarine command.
With the I Bomber Command weakened because it had to divide its strength
between operating as a bombardment unit and as a patrolling unit, the Army air Force
decided to commission a command for protecting American waters from the German
submersibles. On 15 October, 1942 the Army Air Forces centralized their anti-submarine
patrols and created the Army Air Force Antisubmarine Command (AAFAC). This
command followed the British Coastal Command organization, which allowed for a unit
to train and prepare solely for these specific operations. Also this command had more
freedom to take part in anti-submarine warfare.7 Most of the units and equipment of the
AAFAC came from the I Bomber Command due to their previous experience.8 The
AAFAC only enjoyed control in anti-submarine operations for a limited time. Less than a
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year later, the Navy created its own unit for anti-submarine warfare. This change came
about after the German U-Boat victories in the North Atlantic.
In 1943 the United States Navy worked to fix any and all problems associated
with their organization of anti-submarine operations, including training. After the UBoats in the North Atlantic started to sink absurd amount of merchant vessels President
Roosevelt explained a need for victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. 9 Soon after this
statement, the Navy made the final organizational change in regard to the anti-submarine
operations. The Navy created this fleet as a specific command devoted to anti-submarine
operations, the Tenth Fleet. However, the Army Air Force Anti-submarine Command still
operated against the German U-Boats. The Tenth Fleet reintroduced an organizational
problem that existed for years. With the Army in charge of the land-based planes and the
Navy in charge of the implementation of these planes, how could the United States unify
a command devoted to anti-submarine warfare? One side needed to control antisubmarine training and operations to effectively patrol the Atlantic.
The Navy pushed for the Tenth Fleet to have sole jurisdiction in anti-submarine
operations and moved to discontinue the aid of other units. In one of the first moves made
by the Tenth Fleet, the Navy worked to discontinue the Army’s power in the Atlantic.
Specifically, Rear Admiral Low said:
The fact that Army aircraft assigned to antisubmarine operations reported
only to the operational control of Sea Frontier Commander, which resulted
in the anomalous situation of CominCh being unable to give orders to
echelons who were under his juniors because of the Army construction
(with which the Navy did not agree) that such a command relationship
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precluded issue of orders to Army A/S aircraft by anyone except the Sea
Frontier Commanders and the Army Commanders.10
Little by little the Navy substituted their pilots with the current Army Air Force pilots
conducting anti-submarine operations until the Navy had complete control of the Battle
of the Atlantic. Finally, in the summer of 1943, the Army Air Force bowed out of the
argument and agreed to give the Navy, who historically had responsibility in operations
over water, complete control of anti-submarine operations.
At a conference in June 1943, General Arnold agreed to withdraw Army Air
Force control in anti-submarine operations once the Navy had the strength to take over.
This, along with a trade of anti-submarine fitted aircraft for unmodified B-24s ended the
extensive fight over control in anti-submarine operations.11 Finally, in August 1943 the
Army Air Forces designated the AAFAC back to the I Bomber Command, inactivating
their units that patrolled for submersibles.12 This made the Tenth Fleet the unit in charge
of finishing the Battle of the Atlantic. Now the United States had a command with a
centralized training program, cadets received a more unified curriculum.
The Tenth Fleet had no direct attachment with the planes and ships in antisubmarine operations. Instead, the fleet operated through the individual Sea Frontiers and
Fleet Commands.13 The Commander in Charge of the Navy described the directive for
the Tenth Fleet.
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(a) Destruction of enemy submarines.
(b) Protection of Allied shipping in the Eastern, Gulf and Caribbean Sea
Frontiers.
(c) Support of other Anti-submarine Forces of our own and of the Allied
Nations operating in the Atlantic Areas.
(d) Exercise of control of convoys and shipping that are U.S.
responsibilities.
(e) Correlation of U.S. anti-submarine training and material
development.14

Therefore, the Tenth Fleet became responsible for all operations off the coast of the
United States and further into the Atlantic Ocean. Even though the Commander in Charge
did not list of directives above by importance, the succinct explanation of (a) represents a
significant mission in the Atlantic.
The Navy organized the Tenth Fleet into five divisions. The first, Operations
Division under Captain William Sample, handled the forces assigned to anti-submarine
work and the combat intelligence team that plotted U-Boat locations. The Navy also had
the Convoy and Routing Division under Rear Admiral Metcalf that developed the convoy
system used. The Tenth Fleet also contained a Civilian Scientific Council and the Air
Anti-submarine Development Unit Atlantic Fleet. Finally, the Tenth Fleet organized the
Anti-submarine Measures Division.15
The Anti-submarine Measures Division under Captain Haines, and later Captain
Fitz, correlated “anti-submarine research, materiel development, and training.” In July
1943 the Tenth Fleet absorbed ASWORG making those civilian scientists working with
Phillip Morse report directly to this new group.16 The Tenth Fleet put ASWORG under
14
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the leadership of Captain Haines in this division.17 Similar to the establishment of the
Tenth Fleet that consolidated multiple entities into a single body, the Anti-submarine
Measures Division integrated ASWORG to better coordinate anti-submarine training.
To specifically describe the goals of the Anti-submarine Measures Division, the
Commander in Charge of the Navy stated that the division needed to take steps so that:
(a) each ship and plane is proficient in the basic technique of normal
operations both as to personnel and material.
(b) training in the use of sound and special equipment is intensive and
sustained.
(c) all units (surface and air) are subjected to regular refresher courses at
training centers appropriately organized, staffed and equipped.
(d) training is conducted through the medium of a standardised
instructions approved by this Headquarters.18

Along with the list of intentions of the Tenth Fleet, the Navy also circulated ways
to improve an attack on a U-Boat. In June of 1943 the “U.S. Fleet Anti-submarine
Bulletin” summarized different aspects of the anti-submarine war including doctrine and
training. This bulletin communicated new developments in anti-submarine operations and
training more often than the tactical publications.19 Thus, officers constantly learned new
practices to follow in a battle with regularly changing strategies.
Around the same time that the Navy commissioned the Tenth Fleet, The Navy
also established the Aircraft Antisubmarine Development Detachment. This detachment
allowed for a more direct connection between the pilots and the civilian scientists. From
this correspondence, the Navy discovered the proper ways of conducting anti-submarine
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operations. This included finding the best uses of anti-submarine technologies, and
developing improved communications for pilots in anti-submarine warfare. This
command tested different problems in patrolling missions. Students applied the new
techniques of fighting in this detachment.20 From this detachment, the Navy learned new
tactics that they could forward to the training divisions and operational pilots.
The evolution of the divisions, which managed the aircrews in anti-submarine
warfare and their training, built and prepared a competent unit to fight the German
submersibles. With a greater understanding into the organization of anti-submarine
commands and the specific training regiment pilots received, the role of training
demonstrated itself as a valid explanation to the growing success of aircrews in the
Atlantic theater. These improvements in the organization of training combined with the
advice from operations researchers increased the lethality of anti-submarine aircrews.
The developments of the aircrews’ abilities played a part in the statistical achievements
displayed towards the end of the Battle of the Atlantic.
All the improvements in the curriculum and organization, strengthened the
graduating aircrews of the Navy and Army Air Force. Not only did the Allies’ merchant
shipping lanes operate without the slightest fear of damage, but also the Allies sank the
German U-Boats so regularly that the submersibles patrolled waters unimportant to the
war effort. The Allied aircrews increased the attacks made on a U-Boat, the amount of UBoats sunk and their lethality. From the alarmingly low statistics on aircrew proficiency
in the months after Pearl Harbor, the Allies boosted their prowess in anti-submarine
warfare.
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An increase in the amount of U-Boats attacked demonstrated an improvement in
many different factors. Advancements in technology allowed for aircrews to spot a UBoat, and the proper implementation of aircrews to bases in the North Atlantic placed
aviators closer to the U-Boat’s new areas of operations, but also more developed training
helped pilots to properly attack a submersible. Specifically, ASWORG analyzed the best
pattern for pilots to spot any patrolling submersible. Also the pilots learned how to fulfill
their plane’s capabilities. The aircrews also improved on their abilities to spot a
submersible.
The figure below shows the increase in U-Boats attacked from January until
August 1943.21 The graph indicates that Allied aircrews improved on their abilities to
attack a patrolling submersible. Undoubtedly, aircrew performance, from training,
evoked this change in some respect.
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Statistics on the amount of U-Boats sunk also show an improvement of aircrews
in anti-submarine warfare. As I stated in the beginning of this study, the number of UBoats lost sheds light on the competence of Allied aircrews. German submersibles, for
the most part, submerged once they spotted an airplane. Any convoy of merchant vessels
could escape without harm once a U-Boat operated underwater. Only with the destruction
of his U-Boat force, could the Allied claim total victory in the Atlantic.
U.S. forces had trouble in sinking U-Boats in the first few months of the war.
Until August 1942, the German U-Boats operated around American waters with little
danger from aircraft. In August, American planes sunk, or helped to sink four U-Boats.
Compared to the months before, only March and July enjoyed the successes of multiple
U-Boat kills in a single month.23 After this month, the U-Boats retreated to operate in the
North Atlantic, away from Allied aircraft. When U.S. planes started to move to the North
Atlantic, the amount of U-Boats killed grew tremendously. The above graph shows this
increase in U-Boats sunk during 1943. The improvements from early 1942, demonstrate
the progression of Allied aircrews in the Atlantic. Not only did aircraft make more
attacks on U-Boats but also they sunk more in the process.
The lethality of aircraft in the Battle of the Atlantic validated the argument of
training and better-prepared aircrews as an aspect in America’s success against the
German submersibles. The accomplishment of Allied aircrews in properly coordinated
attacks represents the improvements of training in the Atlantic.
When the United States entered the Second World War, American pilots struggled
in not only finding a submersible, but also in executing an attack on a U-Boat that
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damages it. The Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group studied the attacked
by American pilots and realized the horrible inaccuracies of the pilots. These operations
researchers determined that in 1942 that aircraft lethally damaged a U-Boat four percent
of the time. After analysis on those failures and the organizational reform of the Navy
and Army Air Forces did the lethality of pilots rise. The graph below shows the
effectiveness of air attacks on U-Boats in 1943.24 The axis on the left represents the
amount of merchant vessels sunk for every U-Boat sunk. The axis on the right represents
the amount of U-Boats sunk per attack made by the Allies.
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short period, however, the AA tacties were successfully met and the rate of efficiency
rose higher than ever as attacks on surfaced U-boats proved to be the most costly to the
enemy.
On the other hand, the fight-back U-boat has taken a substantial toll in duels with

change in tactics by the German commanders, pilots never reached the low levels of
accuracy of 1942. The graph shows the lethality of the Allies reaching as high as twentynine percent. ASWORG analysts wrote that the percentage increase of U-Boats sunk per
attack, demonstrated the success of training and experience in anti-submarine warfare.25
In 1943, aircrew abilities reached a high level in the Atlantic. No longer did
German U-Boats patrol merchant lanes as they did a year prior. With an increase in the
number of pilots, the United States Navy reestablished themselves as the only force in the
Atlantic. The Tenth Fleet unified anti-submarine training and operations and the Army
Air Force designated their anti-submarine forces back to their original roles as bombers.
Also, after months of analysis and experience in anti-submarine warfare, aircrews knew
the best tactics and techniques to fight the U-Boat. All of these factors came together to
make a strong Navy and Army Air Force.
In 1942, American aircrews reported an inadequate four percent in attacks the
Navy assessed as lethal. In 1943 this number rose exponentially. Allied aircraft pushed
the German U-Boats from the British coast, the American coast and even in the midAtlantic gap, out of range from most aircraft. Finally the Battle in the Atlantic ceased to
be relevant. Well-trained American aircrews defeated the U-Boat menace of 1942,
allowing for the Allies to focus on advancing instead of defending. Even though
American troops still had a lot of fighting left before the Axis surrender, the successes in
the Atlantic roughly marked an end of the beginning in the Second World War.
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CONCLUSION
In the Battle of the Atlantic, training showcased its importance in turning the tides
against the German submersibles. Properly trained aircrews in anti-submarine warfare
reinforced the urgency to not only develop modern technology, but also to prepare
aviators and seamen to fight the U-Boats. Accurate training combined with advances of
anti-submarine weapons, proper implementation of resources and many other reasons, as
an explanation for the American victory in the Atlantic.
This Independent Study looked at the human element in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Warfare in the twentieth century contained more advanced machinery than in any
previous conflict. Countries relied heavily on technological developments to demonstrate
their strength. However, the soldiers, like the technology, had to improve. In a sense,
learning the technologies became more pivotal than its creation. Additionally, parallel to
technological upgrades, more sophisticated tactics emerged, especially in the Atlantic.
Pilots needed to master difficult attacking techniques to successfully destroy a U-Boat.
This thesis examined the role of training for American pilots in the Battle of the
Atlantic. When other authors described pilot training in the Battle of the Atlantic they
wrote about other aspects of the battle as well. Other prominent authors described
technological upgrades, intelligence superiority, and anti-submarine strategies as reasons
for the Allied victory in the Atlantic. All of the arguments above rightfully explained
causes for the destruction of the U-Boat, however in this study I focused only on one
aspect, in order to get a more detailed look at the battle, training. This paper spotlighted
the training aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic including the training regiment of
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American aircrews. This allowed for a more detailed look at one of the many reasons
why America’s effectiveness in the Second World War improved over time.
In the Battle of the Atlantic, exceedingly difficult operations demonstrated the
need for trained aircrews. Atlantic patrols involved hours of looking and waiting in the
hopes of catching a stalking U-Boat. When aircrews spotted a submersible they had only
seconds to move into position and attack before the U-Boat fled. Thus aircrews needed
training to improve their attacks on submersibles.
Since American aircrews lacked proper training in anti-submarine warfare,
German U-Boats enjoyed relative ease in obtaining their objective of economic
disruption. The German objective, equivalent to the First World War, focused on
destruction of Allied merchant cargo to cut off valuable resources to the Allies. The
Allies, on the other hand, concentrated on protecting their ships and sinking the German
submersibles to enable a well-supplied invasion of Europe. When America joined the
battle, the German U-Boats sank tons of merchant cargo. Training, coupled with other
reasons caused America’s inability to fight against the German onslaught.
The defending aircrews never trained in or had experience in the complexities
anti-submarine warfare. Since most of the Naval aviators trained in patrolling the Atlantic
Ocean left for the Pacific theater, the United States had to elicit help from forces unready
for this kind of warfare. The Army Air Force had jurisdiction over the American
continent and therefore they never expected to operate in anti-submarine missions. The
Civil Air Patrol joined the Army Air Force and they also struggled in patrol missions
because CAP pilots lacked the training of anti-submarine operations.
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In some cases, even the most accurate training at the time left operating aircrews
unprepared because America never experienced anti-submarine warfare. Once pilots in
the field learned effective techniques after trial and error, classes taught cadets new
breakthroughs. While pilots slowly discovered more effective ways of fighting, the
German U-Boats succeeded in destroying merchant vessels.
Next, due to the unexpectedly early entrance in the Second World War, the
United States military did not organize their commands efficiently. The Army Air Forces
decentralized their command structure making it more difficult for officers to coordinate
pilot training. The Navy, like the Army Air Force, also needed to reform its structure.
Indirect communication that passed through a commandant who had little knowledge in
aviation hampered the Navy’s ability to operate at a high level.
The United States reluctantly took advantage of the untapped pool of intellectuals
as a way to improve their understanding of anti-submarine warfare and subsequently their
training. The Navy wanted to know the reasons why American pilots failed to sink the
German U-Boats. Even though the Navy unenthusiastically shared their information with
civilian scientists, these analysts proved their worth in finding solutions to pilot errors.
Operations researchers recognized the importance of properly using the resources
currently available. These scientists analyzed the mistakes made by aircrews and
instituted more improved techniques. In one example, scientists examined how to
properly use the technologies at their disposal, which cadets and operational aircrews
soon learned. With the example of depth charges, setting them to a shorter distance
allowed for an increase of damage to a target U-Boat. Along with improvements of
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technology, civilian analysts fixed how pilots searched and attacked German
submersibles.
Improvements in the tactics and techniques of aircrews in anti-submarine
operations enhanced the effectiveness of American forces. Due to the research of
scientific groups like the Antisubmarine Operations Research Group, cadets trained in
techniques like camouflage to surprise a U-Boat. They also learned more specific search
patterns to increase their chances of finding a patrolling submersible.
In 1943, with the help of more adequate training, Allied pilots attacked more UBoats, sank more U-Boats and increased the lethal percentage of their attacks. American
aviators conducted patrol missions at a higher proficiency in 1943 than in 1942 because
they had more satisfactory training in anti-submarine warfare. The spring of 1943 marked
a permanent change in the Battle of the Atlantic. After an abysmal month in March,
where German U-Boats destroyed thousands of tons of cargo, Allied forces sank a
significant number of submersibles. From May 1943 until the end of the war, the German
submersibles struggled to make an impact on Allied shipping.
The Battle of the Atlantic, in the context of the entire war, represented one of the
main obstacles before the invasion of Europe. The retreat of Admiral Doenitz’s U-Boat
army not only demonstrated the importance of well-trained aviators but it allowed for
Allied ground forces to advance against the Axis powers. The opening of sea-lanes in the
Atlantic permitted the transportation of troops and equipment to England to prepare for
the invasion of Europe.1 Secondly, the enormous amount of ships, planes, funds, and
overall effort associated in anti-submarine warfare soon helped other operations, like the
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impending attack on France.2 Training may not have won the Battle of the Atlantic single
handedly, but without the improvement of pilots, who conducted Atlantic patrols, the
Germans would have enjoyed a more one-sided battle.
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convoy that 51 U-Boats were deployed and only a handful of merchant vessels
were lost.
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Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy
in the Second World War Boston: Little, Brown And Company, 1963.
This source, like the previous two books, gives details on the Battle of the
Atlantic from a Naval perspective. This book talks in great detail about the early
situation of Antisubmarine units, including the effects of the large sinking of
cargo ships in 1943. It is this information that is useful in my I.S. because it
allows me to see the impact of the submersible war over time.
Morse, Philip M. “The Beginnings of Operations Research in the United States,”
Operations Research 34, no. 1 January 1986.
The lead scientist of the Anti Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group
wrote this article and it was this organization that studied and analyzed the UBoat war. Philip Morse and his team read through after action reports in the Navy
and even sent scientists to work as field agents so they could witness the problems
first hand. This document explains the history of operations research in America
and it also describes the U-Boat menace in the first couple years of World War II.
Specifically, this article states that the Navy was reluctant to hire civilians to help
them, until the U-Boat started their destruction of East Coast shipping. The Battle
of the Atlantic was getting out of hand and looking at Britain’s use of scientists,
America was ready to start studying their failures. Morse also writes how even
though they can calculate the proper range and effectiveness of a piece of
equipment, his scientists noticed how the crews themselves became another factor
to take into consideration. Finally this document talks about the process the
scientists went through to obtain their data.
Roosevelt, Franklin. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, ed.
Francis Loewenheim. New York: E.P. Dutton & CO., Inc, 1975.
When looking at the seriousness and its overall significance of any conflict, the
opinions and worries of the country’s leaders helps the reader see the impact an
event had on a nation. This book features the conversations between President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. This source allows for me to show the
scarcity of resources of the Allies at the beginning of the war. Roosevelt
comments how the United States can no longer aid Great Britain because the Axis
powers were forcing America to move closer and closer to war.
Syrett, David. History of the Anti-submarine Measures of the Tenth Fleet. November
1981. TS Washington D.C.: Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical
Center.
The Tenth Fleet, activated in May 1943, was created to coordinate naval antisubmarine operations in the Atlantic. This document also gives basic details on an
anti-submarine measures for the Battle of the Atlantic. Specifically this source
gives information on the Air Anti-submarine Development Detachment Atlantic
Fleet and the Anti-submarine Attack Teacher Unit Plan. The development
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detachment was mainly a research-based organization and was used to find how
to effectively use current resources to sink U-Boats. The teaching unit was
implemented as a way to properly refresh aircrews on anti-submarine operations.
This document is useful in my I.S. since it talks about the naval developments in
anti-submarine operations.
Secondary Sources
Air Historical Office, Organization of AAF Training Facilities: 1939-1945. Army Air
Force Historical Studies 53, June 1946.
This document explains the changes made in the Army Air Corps and the Army
Air Force in their command structures during the Second World War. In the early
years of World War II, the Army Air Corps started to decentralize their
organization. Once America entered the Second World War, the Army Air Force
effectively reorganized its commands, which includes training. For my I.S., this
source describes the complexities of working in an organization that has been
decentralized. In some cases flight officers had no knowledge of the training
exercises that took place.
Air Historical Office. Combat Crew and Unit Training in the AAF: 1939-1945. Army Air
Force Historical Studies 61, August 1949.
This source gives information on the training that Army Air Force pilots
experienced during the Second World War. Along with that description, this
source also explains the struggles the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force had
with the rapid increase of cadets to their training facilities. Specifically, the Army
Air Force explains how they cannot properly train their current cadets because of
the United States’ need for more operational pilots.
Archer, William. The Pirate’s Progress: A Short History of the U-Boat. New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers 1918.
This book describes the U-Boat campaigns during the First World War. William
Archer explains the advantages of the submarine and how it surprised the Allies
in the first few years of World War I. For my I.S. this source states the impressive
capabilities of the U-Boat however it also explains that the submarine needed
further development to reach its full potential. The U-Boats thirty years later also
needed more advancement to defeat the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, The Antisubmarine
Command. Army Air Force Historical Studies 107, April 1945.
This document describes the history and operation of the Antisubmarine
Command of the Army Air Force. The Antisubmarine Command held the
responsibility of patrolling the Atlantic Ocean against the German U-Boats.
Learning the specifics of the command helped me in explaining the usefulness of
87

this organization during the Second World War. The creation of this command
improved the previous unit in charge of anti-submarine operations. Specifically,
this source details the training that pilots went through and also the pilots that
comprised of the Antisubmarine Command. This document allows me to explain
the effectiveness of an organization devoted to hunting the U-Boats. Since the
pilots in this Command came from the unit that previously patrolled the Atlantic,
the staff knew many specifics of this kind of warfare. Also pilots in this
organization had more precise training in anti-submarine operations.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Historical Division, Initial Selection of
Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training. Army Air Force
Historical Studies 2, November 1943.
This study looked at the Army Air Force’s methods of selecting Americans to
enlist as cadets. This document details the test given to potential cadets and the
statistics of how many pilots the Army Air Force selects in a given year. This
source helps my final I.S. chapter because it states that the Army Air Force
changed their test for potential pilots during the Second World War. Instead of
earlier written test, which consisted of a variety of questions, the new examination
system asked the student questions that dealt with flying situations. Thus, the
accepted cadets had a better working knowledge of flying situations before they
even took off in a plane.
Baxter 3rd, James Phinney. Scientists Against Time. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1946.
This book describes the contributions that scientists made during the Second
World War. The majority of this book summarizes the technologies that scientists
created during the war. From radar to flamethrowers to anti malaria drugs,
scientists brought research and analysis into motion. Besides this additive for the
Allies, these scientists also researched the proper ways to use new and existing
technologies. For my I.S. I will use the parts on the improvement in techniques
that needed to be mastered by the military personnel operating them.
Buell, Dr. Harold L. “Elimination Base Training – 1941” Naval Aviation Museum
Foundation. Vol 8. No. 2 Fall 1987 73-79. Publisher mislabeled Vol 9. No. 1
This article gives information on the elimination bases at the beginning of the
Second World War. Specifically, the author gives his account of the training he
went through before he became an aviation cadet. I intend to use this account as a
way to describe how Naval Reservists worked to change their status in the Navy
to be Naval Aviators.
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Bureau of Aeronautics. Naval Aviation 1943. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute
1943.
This book contains information of Naval Aviation in 1943. This source replaced
the book Naval Aviation 1934 and details the organization, history and training of
personnel in 1943. For my Independent Study the organizational facts and training
stages paints a clear picture on Naval Aviation during the Second World War.
This book goes step by step of Naval training, including what the cadets learned
and for how long they practiced these procedures before moving on to the next
class. All of these facts will help my second chapter, which deals with the
organization of the Navy and the training curriculum during World War II.
Bureau of Naval Personnel. Navy Wings. Washington D.C.: U.S. Navy Training
Publications Center, 1955.
This book describes the history of Naval Aviation including its development,
organization and training program. From the origins of Naval Aviation until the
War in Korea, this book talks about the changes of this growing field and the
challenges of the Navy in different moments in time. For my I.S. the chapters on
the training program contain information valuable for my second chapter.
Specifically, the establishment of a civilian training program shows the United
States’ commitment to improving their pilots before they go off to war.
Cant, Gilbert. America’s Navy in World War II. New York: John Day Company. 1943.
This book describes the Navy’s role in World War II. Specifically, Cant writes
mostly about Naval operations in the Pacific Theater, but he does dedicate some
time to the Atlantic campaigns. Cant’s detailed work on the Atlantic Front will be
quite helpful in my research. He first explains the early U-Boat operations in the
Atlantic but then goes on to state how anti-submarine warfare was treated as a
secondary mission only when Naval forces were not needed in the primary
operations. He also talks about the situation on the Atlantic Coast. This shows the
United States’ failures early in World War II. Finally this book gives information
on the establishment and friction of the Army and Naval aviation branches.
Carlisle, Norman. The Air Forces Reader: Army and Navy Air Forces. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1944.
This book compiles several different aspects of flying in the Second World War
and details different situations of the pilots. The source examines the war over
Europe, Japan and even the Atlantic. Specifically this book describes the training
regiment of pilots in the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force. I intend on utilizing this
book when I have to explain the specific programs that pilots went through before
they became operational aviators.
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Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). United States Naval Administration in World
War II Volume XIV: Aviation Training, 1940-1945. Washington D.C.: Naval
Historical Center.
This book examines the changes in aviation training by the Navy during the
Second World War. The source describes the administrative changes of the
training programs. For My I.S. I intend to use the first chapter, on the
administrative organization of the Naval Air training program. This chapter
focuses on the efforts for the Navy to centralize its commands pertaining to
training. Specifically the statement from the Committee on Naval Affairs of the
House of Representatives demonstrates how the current administrative
organization of the Naval districts has hindered the training of pilots in the U.S.
Navy.
Daso, Dik Alan. Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower. Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press. 2000.
This book gives biographical information on Hap Arnold, the commanding
General of the Army Air Forces, and information on the development of
American air power. As the General of the Army Air Forces he was in charge of
their new responsibility to fight U-Boats on America’s coastline. This source
gives information on Arnold’s decision to create an operational analysis unit to
research the most effective ways on attacking submersibles. This book is useful in
my project because it gives reasons why operational analysis was both a practical
and powerful method of improving one’s forces.
Gannon, Michael. Operation Drumbeat. New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 1990.
This book looks at U-Boat 123 on its voyages to the American coast in 1942. This
source shows the German experience in the attack on merchant vessels. I intend to
use this source to see the changes in anti-submarine operations from their first
voyage in early 1942 and their last mission in the middle of 1942. I can also read
about the reaction of the German sailors while they were operating in the Western
portion of the Atlantic. For my I.S. I will use this book specifically because it
describes the end of Operation Drumbeat. The U-Boat forces were ordered to
operate in safer waters towards the end of 1942. Gannon writes about the use of
operational analysis and how during these later months trained men were
beginning to work towards sinking the German submersibles.
Hough, Richard. The Longest Battle. New York: William Morrow and Company Inc,
1986.
This book not only studies the navies that fought in the Battle of the Atlantic but
in the entire Ocean war from 1939 – 1945. This source describes the reactions and
strategies of the higher commands and the ordinary seaman during this long
conflict. For my I.S, this book gives valuable information on the background of
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the Battle of the Atlantic. This includes the naval situation of each power at the
onset of war and the tactics of each side.
Commander Karig, Walter USNR, Lieutenant Burton, Earl USNR and Lieutenant
Stephen L. Freeland USNR. Battle Report: The Atlantic War. New York: Rinehart
and Company Inc. 1946.
This book gives the history of the Atlantic operations during the Second World
War. From America’s first missions in the Atlantic Ocean in 1940 to the capture
of Cherbourg in 1944, this source describes the changing situation. For my
Independent Study, the chapter of the anti-submarine war gives me useful
information on the movement of the American Navy from a powerless force in
the Atlantic to an effective submersible organization. Specifically the authors
wrote about the Tenth Fleet and how the Navy organized this new fleet dedicated
to anti-submarine operations.
Kennet, Lee. The First Air War: 1914-1918. New York: The Free Press. 1991.
This source details the beginnings of the airplane in a combat setting. Along with
a description of the technology, this book explains how the men trained to use the
airplanes and how they fought in Europe. For my I.S., explaining the roots of air
combat and technology will help in arguing that the Allies needed to focus on
training because the airplane entered the twentieth century as untested technology.
Mason, David. U-Boat the Secret Menace. New York: Ballantine Books Inc. 1968
This source details U-Boat operations throughout the Atlantic Ocean. It then puts
the entire war into perspective to give the reader a detailed history of World War
II and what the submersibles were up against. This book gives a lot of information
on the successes of the U-Boat offensive known as Operation Drumbeat in 1942.
Mason’s descriptions allow me to write about the American failure to prepare for
an anti-submarine conflict. An extensive narrative is necessary to give the reader
an overview into the Battle of the Atlantic so they can better understand the
complexities of this theater of war. All of that information will make it far easier
to explain the tactics and techniques pilots needed to learn in order to sink a UBoat.
McCloskey, Joseph “British Operational Research in World War II” Operations
Research 35, no. 3 (1987).
This article gives information on the growth of operations research in both the
Atlantic campaign for Great Britain. Following the development and the impact of
the anti-submarine operations group I see the importance of civilian scientists for
the U.S. and British Navy. This source states the many bases these scientists went
to and the relationship between American scientists and those in England. Finally
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this document goes on to state the history of the Tenth Fleet. This division in the
Navy was created to centralize anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic.
Milner, Marc. Battle of the Atlantic. Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2003.
This secondary source gives a general history on the Battle of the Atlantic. For
my Independent Study, I intend to use book to describe different parts of the UBoat war. From the beginning of the war in Europe, off the coast of England, to
America’s entrance, off the United States’ Eastern coast, the impact of the
German U-Boat was immense. This information will allow me to explain the
effects of the Battle of the Atlantic.
Office of Air Force Hsitory. The Army Air Forces in World War II
Volume I: Plans & Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942. ed. Craven,
Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1948.
This book gives a detailed history of the Army Air Force from 1939 until August
1942. This source gives information on the inception of the American Air Corps,
its changes in organization, preparation for war and finally its early operations
against the Axis powers. One chapter in this book that I will give a lot of attention
to is the Battle of the Atlantic. The authors write about the differences of
jurisdiction and training between the Army and Navy Air Forces. They also go on
to state the Army Air Force’s changes when asked to protect American shipping
and also it’s impact on the U-Boat war. This book is a great source for my
research because of the chronological detail of the Army Air Force, and its antisubmarine operations. Specifically, it describes the Army Air Force’s readiness to
fight submersibles. They were not trained at all in dealing with U-Boats yet they
were expected to fight them. At the beginning of the war the Navy’s lack of
resources forced the Army Air Force units to fight on their behalf. Also, the units
equipped to destroy U-Boats were trained in the Army Air Force’s primary
function of bombing area and little practice was given to anti-submarine patrol.
Next, not only were trained Naval aviators sent to the Pacific but also trained
Army aviators were sent to the West coast of the United States. While the AAF
pilots knew how to bomb specific areas, the bombing techniques for antisubmarine operations were very different than bombing land based targets, thus
the U-Boats had little to worry about.
Office of Air Force History. The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume II: Europe:
Torch to Pointblank August 1942 to December 1943. Ed. Craven, Wesley Frank
and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1949.
This book, like the first volume, gives a detailed history of the Army Air Forces
in World War II. This volume in particular gives information from August 1942
until the end of 1943. This source describes the Army Air Force’s operations in
Europe, specifically, in Italy, Africa and in the Atlantic. For my I.S. the chapter
on anti-submarine warfare is ideal for my research. The authors write about the
improvements of the Army Air Force units later in the war against the U-Boats.
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Philpott, William. Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth
Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2010.
This book looks at the Battle of the Somme in the First World War and a brief
history in the years before and after. Specifically, the author explains the history
of the tank and its first use during the Great War. This information helps describe
the growth of technology in the twentieth century and how the tank, like all new
technology between 1914 and 1918 required improvement.
Pomeroy, Colin A. The Flying Boats of Bermuda. Canada: Colin Pomeroy. 2000.
This book looks at the history of the aircrafts used in Bermuda. Specifically this
book details different operational missions in Bermuda. For my I.S. I plan on
using the extensive information on each individual flying boat the Naval Aviators
flew during the Second World War. This information includes the crew size,
distance, and armament of each plane, which will give the reader and myself basic
knowledge of the planes I plan on writing about.
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. New
York: Harper Perennial, 2011.
This book gives a general history on the Second World War. This compelling
novel describes complex aspects of each campaign in a fluid and simple way
without losing any necessary data. The chapter on the Battle of the Atlantic gives
plenty of information perfect for my introduction or any introductory paragraph in
my I.S. Also this source gives many quotes from famous characters in the war that
demonstrate different themes of this violent war.
Roskill, Captain S.W.The War At Sea 1939-1945 vol. II, The Period of Balance. London:
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956.
This secondary source gives a general history on not only the Battle of the
Atlantic but on any sea engagement during the Second World War. For my I.S.
the information Roskill gives on the invasion of German U-Boats on the
American coastline helps paint a picture about the bleak situation for Allied
military personnel and civilians in the first few months on 1942. Specifically the
data printed in the appendices at the end of the book explains the changes in
strength of both forces throughout the war. It is the information that I plan to use
directly in my first chapter.
Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977: Volume 1 1940-1960. Virginia:
R.F. Cross Associates, LTD, 1978.
This source talks about the history of anti-submarine operations by the Navy from
the Second World War until the Korean War. This source writes about the planes
and operations of aviators in anti-submarine operations. For my I.S. this source
gives a lot of background information on sea-based missions and development,
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however, I intend on only using their description of the organization of antisubmarine operations. This source details the Navy’s push for complete control in
the Atlantic Ocean with their creation of the Tenth Fleet in 1943. Specifically, the
Navy writes about the problems they have had in dealing with joint control with
the Army Air Force.
Stegall, Eugene E. “Training the Primary Flight Instructors in World War II” Naval
Aviation Museum Foundation. vol 5 no 1. Spring 1984. 27-34.
This article describes how the Navy trained their instructors in primary flight
training. This source helps me detail who the Navy chose as teachers during the
Second World War in Naval Aviation. These men helped the cadets learn how to
properly fly their aircraft.
Sternhell, Charles and Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II,
Washington, D.C., 1946.
This book describes the operational evaluation of anti-submarine warfare during
the Second World War. The authors dedicate the first half of this source to
summarize different periods of the Battle of the Atlantic. From 1939 until 1945
the book explains U-Boat offensives throughout the war and the subsequent
countermeasures. Under the category of countermeasures the implementation of
both aircraft and scientific research are brought up. The second part of this book
sheds light on specific scientific evaluations during the course of the war. The
descriptions of attack errors and offensive searches have given a large amount of
information that has been useful in my I.S.
Stewart, Irving. Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of
the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1948.
This book explains the implementation of scientific research during World War II.
This source mainly describes the history and organization of the National Defense
Research Committee. The sub divisions of the NDRC are also mentioned in this
book. I will use the information on the organization of the Antisubmarine Warfare
Operations Research Group, a sub division of the NDRC in my third chapter.
Along with that description, the book talks about the use of field agents who
determined problems to analyze, which is essential in my I.S for examining the
relationship between the training commands and the scientists.
Syrett, David. The Defeat of the German U-Boats. Colombia: University of South
Carolina Press. 1994.
This book on the Battle of the Atlantic gives most of the credit towards
technology and implementation for why the allies were able to protect their
convoys. In Syrett’s eyes, the victory of the Battle of the Atlantic depended on the
safety of the merchant vessels. He brings up a good point because the German
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objective was to destroy enough cargo to choke the economy of Britain. For my
I.S. I will be looking at the destruction, not the defeat of the U-Boats. This book
does give a narrative on several convoys from April until September 1943, which
can be helpful if I wanted to describe the situation of American naval personnel in
the Atlantic. Syrett also gives information on the technologies of the Allied
aircraft and the changing situation in the Atlantic. Those details will help me in
understanding the proper chronology of the battle.
The Aviation History Unit, The Navy’s Air War: A Mission Completed New York:
Harper & Brothers Publishers.
This book details the Navy’s air campaigns in World War II. The Aviation
History Unit describes the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of Operations and then
the civilian forces that helped the war effort. Specifically the author explains the
improvement of Naval aviation and its readiness at the start of the war. The next
few chapters detail the operations conducted by Naval pilots. The final section of
this source talks about the training of Naval aviators. The techniques describes
here will be incredibly useful in my final chapter of my I.S.
United States Naval Academy, Naval Operations Analysis. Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1977.
This book gives information on scientific methods to improve naval officers in
their decision-making skills. The first few chapters of this source describe the
history and organization of operations research. With this information, I will write
about the creation and general procedures of operations analysis by the Navy.
Further in this source, the explanation of search and patrol research gives my I.S.
a more detailed look at operations research in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Von der Porten, Edward. The German Navy in World War II. New York: Galahad Books,
1969.
This book focuses on the history and campaigns on the German Navy in the
Second World War. This source allows the reader to view the development of this
highly technical Navy. From the end of World War I the German High Command
needed to organize their Navy and determine its future. This book moves on to the
onset of World War and the subsequent areas of operations by the newly
improved U-Boat. From this information I can write on the German reasoning and
strategies in each area during the Battle of the Atlantic.
Waddington, Professor C.H. O.R. in World War 2: Operational Research against the UBoat. London: Unwin Brothers Limited, 1973.
This source describes the history of Operational research and specific instances
where this research found solutions to problems in the Second World War. The
general view of Operational Research is that it allowed for the analysis on how to
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use instruments of war instead of solely its creation. For my I.S I intend on talking
about British analysis and specific operations where Operational research helped
in anti-submarine warfare.
Warnock, Timothy A. Air Power Versus U-Boats. Air Force History and Museums
Program. 1999.
This government document looks at the use of aircraft in the Battle of the
Atlantic. This source is useful because it gives a summary of the war against the
U-Boats for the Army Air Force. Specifically, this document states that the low
amount of cargo ships sunk in November and December were caused by a redirect
of submersibles from the North Atlantic to the Mid-Atlantic
Williamson, Ronald M. NAS JAX: An Illustrated History of Naval Air Station
Jacksonville, Florida. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Co. 1990.
This book describes the history of the Naval Air Station at Jacksonville, Florida.
Included in this history is the operations conducted on the base. This source writes
about the Navy’s commission of the Naval Air Station, the social lives of the
cadets, the operational history on the base, and a general history of the base year
by year form 1940 until the present day. For my I.S. the operational history gives
an immense amount of information pertaining to training and how the base
prepared for war. Specifically this book details the training of the cadets and the
development of different training programs during the war years.
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